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ON THE RULES REGULATING THE CELEBRATION OF THE ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES

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THE OLD and very illegible inscription from Athens containing the charter of the Eleusinian Mysteries was happily completed by a few small fragments discovered during the American excavations on the Agora. It was not an easy task for Professor B. D. Meritt to bring together the broken pieces and the stone bearing the inscription (now in the British Museum).[1] He did it with his usual epigraphical expertness and contributed very much to the reading and to the restoration of a document which has been a real problem to many scholars for a long time. Of course, the inscription so old and so badly preserved will continue to be debated by specialists in different fields of Classical studies, but the part of Professor Meritt in elucidating this important testimony of the ancient Greek cult always will be gratefully appreciated.[2] I should like to discuss some passages of the document in question in the hope that small changes in certain lines may perhaps make it more intelligible.[3]

The lines C 20–46 contain rules regulating the rights and duties of the Eumolpidai and Kerykes, the representatives of two Eleusinian families, linked closely with the carrying out of the mysteries. The first ordinance is restored by Meritt as follows:

[1] IG I² 6; Syll.³ 42; Ziehen, Leg. Gr. Sacr. II 3; B. D. Meritt, Hesperia XIV (1945), pp. 63 ff., XV (1946), pp. 249 ff.; Suppl. Ep. Gr. X 6.

[2] I am particularly obliged to Professor B. D. Meritt for sending me a copy of the notes he made during his study of the stone in the British Museum and for kind advice given me in his letter. I thank gratefully also Professor A. D. Nock and Professor M. N. Tod for their kind help and suggestions on many points linked with the problems discussed in this article.

[3] Cf. J. et L. Robert, Rev. Ét. Gr. LIX–LX (1946–1947), pp. 313–314, nr.79.

⁝Ε[ὐ]μ[ολπίδ]ας κα-
ὶ Κέρ[υ]κας λαμβάν[εν παρὰ] τῶ μ-
ύστ[ο h]εκάστο π[έ]ν[τε μέρε τῶν]
[τεθυμ]ένον θελειῶ[ν,ἀτελῆ δ'α]-
[ὐτοῖς μ]ύστεμ μὲ ἐνε[ῖναι μυῆ]-
[ν μεδέ]να πλὲν τῶ ἀφ'ἑ[στίας μυ]-
[ομέν]ο:

Meritt is right not to accept the reading *θέλει* proposed by Crönert [4] and viewed favorably by Hiller [5] and Bannier,[6] because it does not make any reasonable sense. The conjecture *θελειῶ*[ν] suggested by Meritt is fitting, but his comment on the restored phrase seems to be debatable. It is hard to understand why the "portions from the female sacrificial victims" (*τὰ θυόμενα θελεῖα*) are mentioned in the rule. We find in certain ritual prescriptions the mention of male and female victims which have to be offered, but there is no reason for a distinction to be made of the sex of the already offered animals, in the rule regulating the distribution and the appropriation of *meat* from the victims.[7] The word *θελειῶν* in line 23 seems to point out the persons who received initiation rather than to the victims. I am inclined therefore to join the word in question to the next phrase and to restore the preceding one as follows: *π[ά]ν[τα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶ | ν θυομ]ένον*.[8] It is not easy to guess what kind of circumstance in relation to the females (and probably males) is treated in the next phrase. According to Meritt's reading and formulation of the rule, the free, without charges, initiation of the privileged child is mentioned as an exception to the general law requiring charges from all other

[4] Gött. Gel. Anz. CLXX (1908), p. 1022.

[5] IG I² 6, 106.

[6] Rhein. Mus. LXXVII (1928), p. 265.

[7] Cf: Syll.³ 56, 15; 998 (=LGS 54), 20; 999 (=LGS 63), 16–17; 1033 (=LGS 103) a 1–2; IG V, 1, 364 (=LGS 57), passim; IG XII Suppl. 73 (=LGS 119), 7; Syll.³ 978 (=Lois Sacr. 55), 10–12; 1044 (=Lois Sacr. 72), 3–4; Dion. Hal. VI 1, 2. Ferguson in the comment on IG II² 1361 (Hesperia, Suppl. VIII, p. 155) writes that the sex of the victims determined whether the priestess or the priest got *τὰ ἱερεώσυνα*. Such an appropriation founded on a purely accidental circumstance would be absolutely unjust. I think that the words in question denote rather persons than victims. The priest assisted usually men in the sacrifices and in the initiations, the priestess did the same in relation to the women.

[8] Cf. Xen., resp. Lac. XV 3; Inschr. Priene 108, 261; 113, 61; IG V 1, 1390 (=LGS 58) 95.

persons. We do not know much what privilege the children called ἀφ'ἑστίας enjoyed. It was certainly an honor bestowed on the offspring of rich and well-to-do families, quite often of the Eumolpidai and Kerykes themselves. The statues set up for such youngsters by the people, the Council and the Areopagus seem to indicate that they were initiated for a certain public purpose.[9] I do not think therefore that the paying of charges has anything to do with their privilege. On the other hand, the reading ἐνε[ῖναι as proposed by Meritt is hardly acceptable. The last preserved letter in line 24 seems to look, according to Meritt, like epsilon. We must find a word beginning with this or like this letter which stays in relation with the above mentioned privilege of children. I cannot find any other favor granted to them as the benefit of age and I restore the word in the gap: ἐνέ[λικα.[10] The whole phrase and rule will be read as follows:

θελειῶ[ν δὲ καὶ ἀρ]-
[ρένομ μ]ύστεμ μὲ ἐνέ[λικα μνῆ]-
[ν μεδέ]να πλὲν τῶ ἀφ'έ[στίας μυ]-
[ομέν]ο:

The rule seems to stipulate that initiation should be conferred on the males and females of a certain age, with the exception of the children chosen for the cult service. We have no information on the age required for the candidate to the initiation, but the moral fitness and accepted obligations suggest they must be already more or less adult.[11] We can consider this rule as an emergency prescription. In certain times a custom began to bring to the initiation very young people. The authorities, to stop that, prescribed an age limit. We know that later, in Roman times, children were again frequently initiated.

The ordinance which follows, prescribes the rule of bestowing the initiation. Meritt again improved the reading of this passage:

[9] On the παῖς ἀφ'ἑστίας cf. H. G. Pringsheim, Arch. Beitr. zur Gesch. des eleus. Kultes, Bonn 1905, p. 41, 118; A. Oepke, Arch. f. Relgw. XXXI (1934), p. 51, n.1; O. Kern, RE VIII (1935), p. 1236; G. Meautis, Rev. Ét. Anc. XXXIX (1937), pp. 105–107; L. Deubner, Att. Feste, p. 75; M. P. Nilsson, Gesch. gr. Rel. II, p. 88, n.1. See also Pol. XII 5, 10.

[10] Cf. OGI 338, 21; Suid. s.v. μεταγωγεῖν. If the letter E is not absolutely certain, one could read: ἐν ἢ[βει.

[11] Cf. P. Foucart, Les mystères d'Eleusis, Paris 1914, p. 275.

Κέρυκας δὲ μυ[ῆν τὸς νέ]-
[ο]ς μύστας hέκαστον [καὶ Εὐμο]-
[λπίδ]ας κατὰ ταὐτά· ἐ[ὰν δὲ κατ]-
ὰ πλείος,εὐθύνεσθα[ι χιλίασ]-
[ι] δρα[χ]μῆσι· μυῆν δὲ [hοι ἂν hεβ]-
ôσι Κερύκον καὶ Εὐ[μολπιδôν].

The sense of the first rule is very acceptable, but the pronoun hέκαστον without the adverb χορίς, as proposed by Wilhelm,[12] leaves the former in the air. On the other hand, the term νέος μύστης is nowhere found in the documents relating to the mysteries.[13] A word linked with the pronoun must be restored and I propose to read: δίχα. The expression δίχα hέκαστον stresses clearly the individual character of the initiation. This rule was dictated perhaps by a growing demand for group initiation because of the great number of the candidates.

The next ordinance regulates the part played by the representatives of the Eumolpidai and Kerykes in conferring the initiation. Here again Meritt contributed to the establishment of the correct text by finding on the stone the letters OΣI which read rightly by Hicks,[14] but changed to AΣI led to the fanciful conjectures of χσύμπ]ασι (Crönert),[15] δόμ]ασι (Bannier),[16] and ἐ[πὶ γέρ]ασι (Ziehen).[17] Meritt restores hοὶ ἂν hεβ]ôσι and explains accordingly that the right of conferring the initiations was enjoyed by all members of the Eumolpidai and Kerykes families who were of mature age. He adds, however, that other verbs as παρ]ôσι, or θέλ]οσι are possible too. I think that the correct reading should be λάχ]οσι which is a technical term and means an appointment by lot.[18] It seems that not all Eumolpidai and Kerykes, but those chosen by lot, bestowed the initiation. We do not know if this appointment was for life, for a year or even for a month, in which the mysteries were celebrated.

[12] Hermes XXXVIII (1903), p. 154.
[13] Cf., however, Orph. hymn. 43, 10.
[14] Anc. Gr. Inscr. Br. Mus. I 2. Dittenberger, Syll.[3] 304 read: ὧσι.
[15] O. c., pp. 1021, 1023.
[16] O. c., p. 266.
[17] Hermes 1944, pp. 217 ff.
[18] Leg. Gr. Sacr. II, 35, 1; 40, 8; 79, 10; Lois Sacrées 11, 1; 35, 1; 79, 10. Cf. Wilamowitz, Heracles II, 113.

Lines 38–42 contain the rule concerning the orphans and other people asking for initiation. The passage is restored by Meritt as follows:

[Εὐμολπ]-
[ί]δ[ας δ'ἔ]χεν ἐν τôι μ[έσοι τὲν β]-
[ύ]β[λον τ]ὲν τôν [ὀ]ρφ[ανôν γράφε]-
[ν] τὸς ὀρφανὸς παῖ[δας καὶ τὸς]
[μ]ύστας hεκάστο με[νὸς χορίς].

The orphans probably enjoyed the privilege of priority in the mysteries as they did in the theater and were consequently initiated before others.[19] We know that the persons having the benefit of προεδρία in the shows and games were usually listed by the authorities and the record was handed to those in charge of the seating arrangement.[20] But the word βύβλος is not a term for such a writing. Because the second letter in line 40 is certainly B, I should be willing to restore τὸν βε]β[αιοτ]έν. There was certainly among the Eumolpidai a qualified man who could ascertain that the young candidate was really an orphan.

The next rule should begin with the particle δέ and consequently there is no space for the restoration γράφεν. As the prescription aims at regulating a new detail of the initiation ceremony, I cannot find a more suitable word of four letters than μνêν, θύεν or ἄγεν. The end of line 42 was restored by Meritt in his first essay as μ[νêσθαι, later he decided to read hεκάστο με[νός, because of a straight vertical trace he saw on the stone after the letter M. But a monthly assembly of mystai, as Meritt remarks himself, is not very probable, the mysteries being celebrated only twice a year. The pronoun hέκαστομ seems to point out that a word should be restored which refers to the behavior of each mystes during the initiation. I propose therefore to read: π[ροτέλεια.[21]

We should note in conclusion that the rules regulating the celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries were drawn up and issued

[19] Cf. O. Schulthess, Vormundschaft nach att. Recht, Zürich 1886, pp. 31–32.

[20] Syll.[3] 915 a 2; IG IV 932, 61. Cf. A. Wilhelm, Urk. der dram. Auf. p. 236.

[21] On the preliminary ceremonies before the initiation itself cf. P. Roussel, Bull. Cor. Hel. LIV 1930, pp. 51–55.

not at one time, but grew slowly as the current customs and popular need dictated. This is clear not only from the character of the writing, but from the general order of the subject matter. One item or the detail of it is treated in different parts of the document and certain rules (those for instance concerning the children) were changed or modified by others as the practice gradually changed. We are not therefore dealing with an actual charter of the Eleusinian Mysteries, issued once for all, but with rules and ordinances published one by one and cut on the stone at different times.

In the light of this comment I propose the following reading of the regulation of the Eleusinian Mysteries:

Ε[ὐ]μ[ολπίδ]ας κα-
ὶ Κέρ[υ]κας λαμβάν[εν παρὰ]τῶ μ-
ύστ[ο h]εκάστο π[ά]ν[τα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶ]-
[ν θυομ]ένον. θελειῶ[ν δὲ καὶ ἀρ]-
[ρένομ μ]ύστεμ μὲ ἐνέ[λικα μυῆ]-
[ν μεδέ]να πλὲν τῶ ἀφ' ἑ[στίας μυ]-
[ομέν]ο: Κέρυκας δὲ μυ[ῆν δίχα τ]-
[ὸ]ς μύστας hέκαστον [καὶ Εὐμο]-
[λπίδ]ας κατὰ ταὐτά· ἐ[ὰν δὲ κατ]-
ὰ πλείος, εὐθύνεσθα[ι χιλίασ]-
[ι] δρα[χ]μῆσι· μυῆν δὲ [hοὶ ἂν λάχ]-
οσι Κερύκον καὶ Εὐ[μολπιδῶν].
τῶ δὲ hιερῶ ἀργυρί[ο τῆς δαπά]-
[ν]ες ἐχ[σε]ῖναι Ἀθεν[αίοις ἄρχ]-
[ε]σθαι, h[έ]ος ἂν βόλο[νται, καθά]-
περ τῶ τῆς Ἀθεναία[ς ἀργυρίο]
τῶ ἐμ πόλει· τὸ δὲ ἀρ[γύριον τὸ]
ς hιεροποιὸς ἐ[ν] τῶ[ι hιερῶι ἐ]-
[μ] πόλει ταμιεύεσθ[αι. Εὐμολπ]-
[ί]δ[ας δ'ἔ]χεν ἐν τῶι μ[έσοι τὸμ β]-
[ε]β[αιοτ]ὲν τῶν [ὀ]ρφ[ανῶν. θύεν δ]-
[ὲ] τὸς ὀρφανὸς παῖ[δας καὶ τὸς]
[μ]ύστας hέκαστομ π[ροτέλεια],
[τ]ὸς μύστας τὸς Ἐλε[υσῖνι θυο]-
[μ]ένος, ἐν τῆι αὐλῆι[ἐντὸς τῶ h]-

45 [ι]ερῶ, τὸς δὲ ἐν ἄστει[θυομένο]-
ς, ἐν τῶι Ἐλευσινίοι.[22]

Translation

The Eumolpidai and Kerykes shall receive from each *mystes* all parts (assigned to them) from the victims sacrificed. They shall not initiate a *mystes* from females and males who is not of the (prescribed) age save the child who is initiated ἀφ'ἑστίας. The Kerykes shall initiate separately each *mystes*, the Eumolpidai shall (do) the same; if they initiate several (at once), they shall be mulcted a thousand drachmai. Those from the Kerykes and Eumolpidai who are chosen by lot, shall carry out the initiation. The Athenians have the right to control the expenditure from the sacred money, as long as they wish, just as from the money of Athena on the Acropolis; the *hieropoioi* shall administer the money in the temple on the Acropolis. The Eumolpidai shall have among them the guarantor of the orphans. Each of the orphans and of the *mystae* shall offer the preliminary sacrifice (called) *proteleia*. Those of the *mystae* who sacrifice in Eleusis (shall do it) in the hall into the sanctuary, those who sacrifice in the city (shall do it) in Eleusinion.

[22] Supplementary note. Because of technical difficulties in printing, the dots could not be put underneath certain letters in the beginning (*b.*) and the end (*e.*) of lines (as seen on the stone). Mark with dots the following letters: π (l.22,*e.*); υ (l.24,*b.*); ε (l.24,*e.*); ε (l.25,*e.*); χ (l.33,*b.*); ε (l.37,*e.*); μ (l.39,*e.*); π (l.42.*e.*).

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MILTON'S ARIANISM RECONSIDERED *

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WHEN in 1825 Bishop Charles Sumner published the text and his translation of Milton's long-lost theological study, the Christian Doctrine, the results were in a way disastrous for the reputation of the poet. Instead of being the great composer of the orthodox epic of Protestantism, Milton became in the eyes of the nineteenth century and even of our own day the heretic who advocated the belief in an unequal Trinity — a heresy originally associated with the fourth century church leader Arius. In the light especially of the fifth chapter of the Christian Doctrine, critics reread Paradise Lost and discovered that this same doctrine was implied in passages of the poem which had been accepted for a century and a half as entirely orthodox. The shock to critical and religious sensibilities was considerable; Milton's fame underwent an eclipse from which it perhaps has never really recovered.[1] Although our own century may be less susceptible to disturbance from the presentation of heterodox views, much the same conception of Milton continues; all critics echo Masson's stern judgment that Milton's views of the nature of Christ "are expressly and emphatically those of high Arianism." [2]

Acceptance of the theory that Milton was an Arian implies, however, two rather strange twists in his thought. In the first place, he never supports Arius in his works. Hardly one to hide his light under a bushel, no matter how unpopular it might be with dim-eyed contemporaries, Milton does mention Arius sev-

* I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Duke University and to the Folger Shakespeare Library for grants which made this paper possible.

[1] In This Great Argument, Princeton (1941), pp. 3 ff., Maurice Kelley writes of the dismay which the publication of the Christian Doctrine occasioned.

[2] David Masson, The Life of John Milton, New York (1946, reprint edition), VI, 823. Kelley holds that the Christian Doctrine "asserts Arian views on the Son of God" and that Paradise Lost is Arian too. Although "Milton's is not an extreme type of Arianism" in Kelley's eyes and "the theologian would perhaps find 'anti-Trinitarian' a more exact term," yet, like other twentieth century readers of Milton, Kelley has "used the two terms interchangeably" and argues also that "Miltonists . . . should cease to question the anti-Trinitarianism of Paradise Lost." Pp. 6, 11 ff., 35 n. 22, and 118 n. 86.

eral times in his writings but without any suggestion of indebtedness or kinship.[3] Moreover, no contemporary biographer ever mentions the fact that Milton expressed Arian views during his lifetime, though it seems a fair assumption that had he done so the fact would have come to the attention of at least some of the poet's antagonists.

In the second place, Milton was clearly aware that his conception of the Son was unusual in the Christian tradition — his introductory remarks to Chapter V of the Christian Doctrine admit such awareness — but despite his fine training in theology he does not seem to realize that he is supporting beliefs recognized as heretical. Indeed, the book is addressed to Protestants of all denominations — "To all the churches of Christ, and to all who profess the Christian Faith throughout the world" (XIV, 3) — in an effort to present a united program for all communicants. Milton would have been almost incredibly naïve had he planned a world-wide Protestant movement which would consciously include one of the most famous heresies of church history — a heresy which, according to Ephraim Paget, had as recently as 1611 caused "Bartholomew Legate, an obstinate Arrian" to be burned in Smithfield and Edward Wightman to be burned at Lichfield.[4] The conclusion seems evident: in his own eyes Milton was not an Arian, even though modern judges are unanimous in branding him one.

As a matter of religious history, the relationship among Father, Son, and Spirit was long a bitterly debated issue. The theological problem involves the establishment of a valid distinction among the persons without destruction of their basic unity. Some have thought that the second and third members of the Trinity are merely two phases of the activity of a single God; this is the Sabellian heresy, which destroys any real distinction of one person from another. Others, including Bishop Arius, distinguished the Son from the Father as a subordinate entity, created in time and differing in substance from the Father.[5] Especially important

[3] Even in the midst of the main "Arian" chapter of the Christian Doctrine, he casually mentions Arius, but without any sense of identification. Works, New York (1931–38), XIV, 293.

[4] Heresiography, Or a Description of the Hereticks and Sectaries Sprung Up in These Latter Times, London (1661), p. 157.

[5] Orthodox church fathers vigorously and successfully campaigned to have all of Arius' writings destroyed. Accordingly his ideas are available to us only through

is Arius' theory that the Son is generated "out of nothing" — ἐξ ὀυκ ὄντων [6] — not from the paternal substance. Thus the Son is only a creature like the rest of the divine creation and is no more to be worshipped than is any other created entity. Nor is he coeternal with the Father.

To resolve these differences and to reunite the Church, which had been weakened by them, the Council of Nicaea in 325 authoritatively affirmed that the three persons in the Trinity are of one substance. The question of equality was discussed but not authoritatively disposed of nor was that of the eternity of the three persons, though both equality and eternity have been generally accepted by Christians since that day.[7] The affirmation of the Son's origin from divine substance left no doubt in anyone's mind as to his divinity. As the Nicene Creed states, Christ is "the only-begotten Son of God; Begotten of his Father before all worlds . . . ; Begotten, not made [ποιηδέντα]; Being of one substance [ὁμοούσιον not μονοούσιον, however] with the Father, By whom all things were made." [8] The Church of England reaffirms this Creed in its Eighth Article of Religion; the Presbyterians, the other church dominant in England in Milton's time, state in the Westminster Confession of Faith that "In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons of one substance, power, and eternity. . . . The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son." [9]

Milton, accepting no authority other than the Bible, seems to have quite different views. Much of Chapter V of the Christian

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statements made by his opponents, of whom Athanasius is by far the most important. This summary is taken from his Orationes contra Arianos, I, 5 and 6. See also H. M. Gwatkin, The Arian Controversy, London (1898), p. 7.

[6] The phrase is originally from 2 Maccabees 7:28.

[7] See the discussion by Harry A. Wolfson in The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Cambridge, Mass. (1956), I, 217 f.

[8] In the original Nicene Creed which was adopted to oppose Arianism, Christ is "begotten of the Father, an only-begotten — that is, from the essence (*ousia*) of the Father — . . . begotten, not made, being of one essence (*homoousion*) with the Father, by whom all things were made. . . . But those who . . . maintain that the Son of God is of a different essence (*hypostasis* or *ousia*)" are anathematized. See Gwatkin, pp. 29–30. Note that neither Nicene Creed expressly affirms the Son's eternity nor the equality of the members of the Trinity. Only in the "Athanasian" Creed are "The whole three Persons . . . coeternal and coequal."

[9] Chapter II; see also Chapter VII.

Doctrine is given over to a long argument that Father and Son differ in essence: the Son is generated by the external efficiency of the Father inasmuch as God's "external efficiency" is divided into "generation" of the Son (and presumably of the Spirit), "creation" of the universe (presumably up through the angels), and "government of the universe" (XIV, 179). Accordingly, the Son was made of God's own nature and substance — not, as with Arius, ἐξ ὀυκ ὄντων: "God imparted to the Son as much as he pleased of the divine nature, nay of the divine substance, itself, care being taken not to confound the substance with the whole essence, which would imply, that the Father had given to the Son what he retained numerically the same himself" (XIV, 193); or as Paradise Lost says of the Son, "in him all his Father shone / Substantially express'd" (III, 139 f.). But we are not to infer that the Son is "co-essential with the Father . . . ; otherwise the Father and the Son would be one person" (XIV, 187). The Son so generated is the agent for creation, not the ultimate cause (XIV, 205). Since Father and Son differ in essence, they cannot be equal: they are "not only not co-essential, but not co-equal" (XIV, 211); God could not "beget a co-equal Deity, because unity and infinity are two of his essential attributes" (XIV, 311). Furthermore, the begetting must have taken place within the limits of time and so was not eternal (XIV, 189 and 309). Following the Gospel of John, Milton holds that "the Son existed in the beginning, under the name of the logos or word, and was the first of the whole creation" (XIV, 181). Nothing necessitated this generation: it "arose from no natural necessity" in the Father (XIV, 185) but "of his own free will. . . . For questionless it was in God's power not to have begotten the Son" (XIV, 187). The results are two different divine beings, one only "as they speak and act with unanimity" (XIV, 211) as well as "in love, in communion, in agreement, in charity, in spirit, in glory" (XIV, 213).

How then is the Son divine? "By the same right as he enjoys the title of the Word, or of the only begotten Son, namely, by the will of the one God" (XIV, 255). In addition, the Son has certain attributes traditionally associated with him: remission of sins, preservation, renovation, the power of conferring gifts, media-

tion, resuscitation from death, judgment, divine honors, baptism in his name, belief in him, divine glory, and coming to judgment (XIV, 321–43). As a matter of fact, the Father is utterly beyond human knowledge: "to know God as he really is, far transcends the power of man's thoughts, much more of his perception" (XIV, 31); we may know him only indirectly in his image, his Son (XIV, 251, 253, 265). We may summarize that for Milton the Son is different from the Father, inferior to him, generated at the beginning of creation, but of the divine substance. This in no way derogates from the Son's incarnation as Christ nor from the traditional beliefs attached to his earthly appearance — beliefs which are considered in later chapters of the Christian Doctrine. In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that Milton never in any of his writings denies the divinity of the Son or even suggests such a denial.

Chapter VI deals in a similar manner with the Holy Spirit. Milton does not know how he originated (XIV, 359), but considers him "as inferior to both Father and Son" (XIV, 377). Like the Son, the Spirit is "actually and numerically distinct from God himself [and] cannot possibly be essentially one God with him whose Spirit he is" (XIV, 379). Accordingly, Milton concludes that the Spirit, "inasmuch as he is a minister of God and therefore a creature, was created or produced of the substance of God [like the Son], not by a natural necessity, but by the free will of the agent, probably before the foundations of the world were laid, but later than the Son, and far inferior to him." He adds that there may be some difficulty in distinguishing Son and Spirit (XIV, 403).

Now as anyone who has made a close study of the Christian Doctrine is only too well aware, Milton there claims and faithfully follows just one source — the Bible. This book he considers to be the only sure guide for faith; he accordingly weights down his work with thousands of quotations from it to prove his points. Objective though his method seems to be, he twists the meaning of verses to suit his own preconceptions — preconceptions which any student of the book will readily admit are present. Whence these preconceptions about the Trinity? According to Edward Phillips, Milton used Wolleb and Ames, two compilers of Prot-

estant compendiums, as his model in the treatise; [10] but they do not support his apparently Arian views. Thus Ames is quite orthodox in holding that "The same essence is common to three subsistences [of the Trinity]. They are distinguished among themselves, as Relatives by certaine relative properties; so as one cannot be another; yet they are together in nature, neither can they be said to be former, or latter; but in order of beginning, and manner of subsisting." [11]

Elsewhere in England, anti-trinitarianism was indeed not dead in Milton's own day. Masson has shown that such men as Thomas Webb, Paul Best, John Biddle, Samuel Richardson, and John Goodwin were active in supporting this thesis during the mid-1640's.[12] But these are relatively unimportant writers who never achieved any real intellectual leadership. Biddle (or Bidle) may be taken as typical. He holds that a supreme created Holy Spirit exists, supreme "by way of excellency only. . . . In like manner . . . there is one *made* Lord by way of Excellency only, which is Jesus of Nazareth, who after he had been crucified by the *Jews*, was raised up from the Dead, and exalted to the right Hand of God, and by him made Lord and Christ." [13] Biddle is like Milton in asserting that the members of the Trinity differ in essence: Christ "must either have the same Essence in number, or a different one. Not the same Essence in number, for then he will not be equal with God in Essence, but the same; for Equality must be in respect of two things different at least in number, otherwise it will not be Equality, but Identity. . . . If Christ hath an Es-

[10] Phillips' actual words are that Milton wrote "from his own dictation, some part, from time to time, of a tractate which he thought fit to collect from the ablest of divines who had written of that subject: Amesius, Wollebius, &c." But was this the Christian Doctrine? The published work is not in any sense a collection of passages from these or any other writers; rather, it is a compilation of biblical verses. Its organization seems traditional.

[11] William Ames, The Marrow of Sacred Divinity, London (1642), p. 15.

[12] Masson, III, 157 f. I should add here that Martin Larson's attempt to trace Milton's conception of the Trinity to Servetus (PMLA, XLI, 1926, 891–934) does not seem convincing. Servetus' ideas are easily available in The Two Treatises of Servetus on the Trinity, trans. E. M. Wilbur, in Harvard Theological Studies, XVI (1932).

[13] John Bidle, A Confession of Faith Touching the Holy Trinity (1648), p. 2, reprinted with separate pagination in The Faith of One God, Who is Only the Father; and of One Mediator between God and Men, Who is Only the Man Christ Jesus, London (1691).

sence different in number from that of God, it must needs also be inferiour thereunto, there being no Essence equal to his" (pp. 5–6). But the differences from Milton are far greater: the Spirit was present at creation but Christ was not (p. 5); the Word is really the Spirit and Christ was not divine before his birth (p. 11); Christ is the interpreter of God's will and nothing more (pp. 16–17).

II

But affinities do occur between Milton and some of his contemporaries at Cambridge — men who have more than once been accused too of Arianism. Henry More and Ralph Cudworth in particular tried to reconcile the Christian Trinity with a trinity once of immense importance to Christians but now practically forgotten: that of Platonism.

For Platonism had its trinity too, which has interested Christians in many stages of their history. The origins of this trinity are lost to us — certainly it can be deduced from Plato's dialogues only by the most violent wresting of meaning. Perhaps one of the earliest statements of the principle — at least one of direct concern to Christians — is to be found in the pseudo-Platonic Epistle II: "Now I must expound [the nature of 'the First'] in a riddling way. . . . The matter stands thus: Related to the King of All are all things, and for his sake they are, and of all things fair He is the cause. And related to the Second are the second things; and related to the Third the third. About these, then, the human soul strives to learn, looking to the things that are akin to itself, whereof none is fully perfect. But as to the King and the objects I have mentioned, they are of quite different quality." [14] One can hardly say that this constitutes a very definite statement about anything; but it does assert that there are three original causes in the universe, which are related to each other. It is a trinity of sorts. And it is sufficiently vague that almost any extension of meaning may be read into it.

From the time of Numenius (2nd century A.D.), regardless of the precise form taken by the various interpretations of this trin-

[14] Timaeus and Epistles, trans. R. G. Bury, London (1929), 312 E.

ity, all agreed in the basic inequality of its members. Plotinus (205?–270) presents the theory in its complete form, but it appears in one shape or another in every neoplatonist. In his Enneads this trinity is the One (το ἕν), Mind (νοῦς),[15] and Soul (ψυχή). The One, which is unknowable,[16] overflows or emanates into Mind, which in turn emanates into Soul in a descending series. Such an emanation is eternal, like the orthodox Christian view of the generation of the Son. Furthermore, it is not willed; part of the nature of the One is to emanate Mind and Soul, as well as ultimately lower orders (Ennead V, i, 6). These lower emanations desire to return to higher ones, and all seek reunion with the One. This desire for return to the source of all being is as central to neoplatonism as is the emanative descent. As Proclus writes, "all things proceed in a circuit, from their causes to their causes again. There are greater circuits and lesser, in that some revert upon their immediate priors, others upon the superior causes, even to the beginning of all things. For out of the beginning all things are, and toward it all revert."[17] Iamblichus gives further details: "there is one God . . . immoveable, and abiding in the solitude of his own unity. For neither is the intelligible connected with him, nor any thing else; but he is . . . father alone, and is truly good. For he is something even greater and prior to this, is the fountain of all things, and the root of the first

[15] No really satisfactory translation is at hand for this term. MacKenna uses the awkward *intellectual principle* in his translation of the Enneads; Inge uses *Spirit* in his Philosophy of Plotinus, London (1948, 3rd ed.) but this unfortunately suggests the third rather than the second member of the Christian Trinity. E. R. Dodds in his translation of Proclus' Elements of Theology, Oxford (1933), uses *intelligence*. English writers in the seventeenth century were generally satisfied with *mind*.

[16] For Plotinus' main discussion of the relationship of the three "Persons" of the neoplatonic trinity, see Enneads, V, i. Besides being quite unknowable, the One is, as Proclus says, utter unity as well: "Every manifold is posterior to the One." Dodds notes that "this proposition demonstrates that the Absolute Unity . . . is completely transcendent in the sense of being uninfected by plurality." Elements, Prop. 5 and note, p. 191. Milton's God is likewise in the final sense unknowable (Works, XIV, 31) and utterly unified: "nothing can be said of the one God which is inconsistent with his unity, and which assigns to him at the same time attributes of unity and plurality" (XIV, 51).

[17] Elements, Prop. 33. In Paradise Lost Milton states that after the Last Judgment "God shall be All in All" (III, 341; see also V, 469 f.), an idea elaborated in the Christian Doctrine (Works, XVI, 367). Though the Christian source is 1 Cor. 15:24–8, the idea is identical with the neoplatonic "return."

intelligible forms. But from this one deity, the God who is sufficient to himself unfolds himself into light. For this divinity, also, is . . . prior to essence, and the principle of essence. For from him entity and essence are derived; and hence, also, he is denominated the principle of intelligibles. . . . Other leaders preside over the fabrication of visible natures." Thus the "demiurgic intellect," the "curator of truth and wisdom," descends "into generation" and leads "the power of occult reasons into light." [18] In conclusion, an important consideration must be stressed with regard to the neoplatonic conception of the entire creation, visible and invisible: it is both timeless and unwilled, quite unlike the Christian conception of the visible creation based on Genesis.[19]

Now these three powers or entities of the neoplatonic trinity may be found (by those who wish to find them) in other Platonists. Two of these writers are especially important to Christianity: Hermes Trismegistus (thought by many in the seventeenth century to be the true pagan originator of the whole revelation but actually a group of writers active in the third century A.D.) and Macrobius (late fourth century A.D.). In addition but not a true neoplatonist is the much earlier (early first century A.D.) Platonizing Jew Philo, but he will be treated separately.

As has been observed, the second person of the Plotinian trinity is *Nous*, not *Logos* as in Christianity. Hermes is the main neoplatonist to express the trinity with the term *Logos* (taken from the Stoics or from Philo) instead of *Nous*. In the Hermetica the First God or the One reveals himself in light; "from the Light there came forth a holy Word [*Logos*], which took its stand upon the watery substance [of the creation]; and methought this Word was the voice of the Light." Poimandres explains that the light is "Mind, the first God, who was before the watery substance which appeared out of the darkness; and the Word which came forth from the Light is son of God." [20] Toward the end of the passage

[18] On the Mysteries of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians, trans. Thomas Taylor, Chiswick (1821), pp. 301–302.

[19] Cf. Dodds' note in Elements, p. 290. But with regard to the eternal generation of the Son the similarity is striking.

[20] Hermetica, ed. and trans. by Walter Scott, Oxford (1924), I, 117. Scott notes (II, 24) that the writer has hypostatized the Logos, as had Philo. Later in this Libellus it is expressly paralleled with the Demiurgos-Nous of the Platonists (cf.

occurs a hymn to God: "Holy is God the Father of all, who is before the beginning. . . . Holy art Thou, who by thy Word hast constructed all that is." [21] In Hermes, then, the Christian could find a neoplatonic trinity whose second person was quite similar to St. John's Logos.

Macrobius furnishes us with a description of the neoplatonic trinity which is in some ways similar to the Christian and which also offers a good summary of the pagan trinity as it was typically treated: "God, who both is and is called the First Cause, is alone the beginning and source of all things which are and which seem to be. He, in a bounteous outpouring of his greatness, created [*creavit*] from himself Mind. The Mind, called *nous*, as long as it fixes its gaze upon the Father, retains a complete likeness of its Creator, but when it looks away at things below creates from itself Soul. . . . Soul, creating and fashioning bodies for itself — on that account the creation, which men who really know about God and Mind call *nous*, has its beginning in Soul — out of that pure and clearest fount of Mind from whose abundance it had drunk deep at birth, endowed those divine or ethereal bodies, meaning the celestial sphere and the stars which it was first creating, with mind." Then, "since Mind emanates from the supreme God and Soul from Mind, and Mind, indeed, forms and suffuses all below with life . . . and since all follow on in continuous succession, degenerating step by step in their downward course, the close observer will find that from the Supreme God even to the bottommost dregs of the universe there is one tie, binding at every link and never broken. . . . This discussion of Soul," he concludes, "embraces the opinions of all who are known to have made pronouncements about the soul." [22]

I, 119, and II, 32). The parallels with Milton are obvious, but they can be matched in many other writers.

[21] Hermetica, I, 131. I have capitalized *Word* although Scott argues that it is not hypostatized here (II, 70). But in the seventeenth century one could hardly read the passage with other than Christian meaning.

[22] Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, trans. William H. Stahl, New York (1952), pp. 143–146. The fact that Mind is described as created and not eternal should be noted. In several other details Macrobius' ideas are analogous to those of Milton: cf. the origin and destiny of the soul (pp. 124–125; Milton, Works, XV, 239, and my own "Milton's Materialistic Life Principle," JEGP, XLV, 1946, 74). Milton's Limbo of Vanities (Paradise Lost, III, 444 ff.) may owe something

Many Christian fathers, whether they were Arians or not, were influenced by these and other expositions of the neoplatonic trinity. St. Augustine, for instance, admits that he came to Christianity by way of "certain books of the Platonists" and quotes sentences which parallel the doctrines of the two trinities (excepting the Christian Incarnation).[23] Just how much influence the neoplatonic theory had upon Arius and his followers is difficult to say. The two systems are similar in their graduated scale of divinity. But the neoplatonic trinity is eternal and derived from the substance of the One; the Arian begins in time and its second person is created out of nothing. The neoplatonic is not willed; the Arian is willed. Inge observed that "Platonism, if it identifies the Logos-Christ with νοῦς, and the Holy Spirit with the universal Soul, cannot maintain that the three persons are coequal."[24] Long ago Cory noted that this "spurious Platonism" regarding the Trinity is "intimately connected" with the heresy.[25] Ultimately back of it, as Gwatkin correctly emphasized, was rationalism: Arianism "was almost as much a philosophy as a religion. It assumed the usual philosophical postulates, worked by the usual philosophical methods, and scarcely referred to Scripture except in quest of isolated texts." By considering the Trinity from the point of view of rationality rather than dogma, it consequently arrived at the conception of an unequal Trinity, which "forms a descending series separated by infinite degrees of honour and glory, not altogether unlike the Neoplatonic Triad of orders of spiritual existence extending outward in concentric circles."[26]

III

Before we consider how the seventeenth century interpreted these matters, we must turn back to Philo, who was undoubtedly the most important conveyor of Platonism to the early Christian movement. The Philonic God, it must be observed first, is quite unknowable (like the later neoplatonic One and like Milton's)

to the Commentary, p. 126. Macrobius' description of creation, p. 182, is similar to Milton's lines in Paradise Lost, VII, 235 ff.

[23] Confessions, trans. E. B. Pusey, New York (1950), VII, 9.

[24] Plotinus, II, 210.

[25] Isaac P. Cory, Ancient Fragments, London (1832, 2nd ed.), Introduction, p. li.

[26] Gwatkin, pp. 20, 26.

in the absolute sense: as Wolfson summarizes, Philo's "God cannot be apprehended by any man, not only as an object of sense but even as an object of intelligence." [27] Next, following Plato, Philo accepted the reality of a world of intelligibles. When God determined upon the visible creation, he "first fully formed the intelligible world . . . and then, with that for a pattern, the world which our senses can perceive." [28] The "intellect" which perceives the intelligible world Philo does not call *Nous*, as the later neoplatonists excepting Hermes would, but *Logos*: "the universe that consisted of ideas would have no other location than the Divine Reason [*θεῖον λόγον*] which was the Author of this ordered frame" of the later-created, visible universe.[29] The substitution of *Logos* for *Nous* was of major importance for the development of the Christian conception of the second person of the Trinity, since the Logos is central in the Prologue to the Gospel of John. In Philo, then, God thinks the ideas of the intelligible world; the Mind of God is termed the Logos and it is at this stage "identical with the essence of God" and does not exist as a separate entity.[30] But the ideas leave the mind of God and take on an external existence as the intelligible world, no longer identical with his essence. The Mind which embraces this intelligible world thus also comes into existence as an entity separate from God; Philo continues to call this separated Mind by the same name that it had when it was part of the divine essence: the Logos. The Logos, then, has in Wolfson's analysis of Philo two stages of existence: a first one, uncreated and from eternity, when it exists only as God's thought (not as a person), and a second one when it is generated as God externalizes his thought into an intelligible world. Philo often speaks of the Logos as "created," though sometimes he says that it is "eternal." [31] It is eternal in that it had so existed as a property of God. When it enters its second and exter-

[27] For the exposition of Philo's ideas I follow Harry A. Wolfson, Philo, Cambridge, Mass. (1948). He discusses Philo's transcendent God on II, 119, giving an extended argument and observing that this conception is new in the history of western philosophy and religion.

[28] "On the Creation," iv, in Works, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (Loeb, 1929), I, 15, 17. See also Wolfson, Philo, I, 226 ff.

[29] "On the Creation," v, in Works, I, 17; cf. Wolfson, Philo, I, 230.

[30] Wolfson, Philo, I, 231.

[31] Wolfson, Philo, I, 234 f.

nal stage as an entity it is properly said to be created. As such, it "is eldest and most all-embracing of created things." [32] The creation of the Logos, Wolfson holds, is made not from God's substance but from nothing (ἐξ ὀυκ ὄντων).[33] Finally, it may enter yet a third stage, where, after the creation of the world, it becomes immanent there,[34] but we are not concerned here with this development.

Although Philo's two-stage conception of the Logos is forgotten by Christians today, it was unquestionably a central consideration in the effort of early Christians to establish just what they meant by the Trinity before the Council of Nicaea. Omitting the question of whether it guided the author of the Gospel of John in his opening imitation of Genesis, we can easily demonstrate that many of the earliest church fathers — the so-called Apologists — follow Philo in his consideration of a two-stage Logos and apply it to the Christian three-stage Logos-Jesus. Indeed, Wolfson finds the influence of Philo on every writer from Justin Martyr to Clement of Alexandria and Lactantius, all of whom seem to have identified the Johannine and Philonic Logos and interpreted the former in terms of the latter.[35] Tertullian, for instance, whose thought Milton often follows, asserted that "before all things God was alone." But "even then God was not without reason or what is called Logos. But 'as soon as it pleased God' to create the world, He 'put forth the Logos himself.' It is this proceeding of the Logos from God that constitutes 'the perfect nativity of the Logos.' " [36] Accordingly, Tertullian takes "In the beginning was the Word" to refer to the emanation or generation by which the Word entered its second stage of existence and became a person separate from the Father.[37]

Indeed, Philo had stressed that God was alone from eternity. When about to make Eve, God observes, "It is not good that man should be alone" (Gen. 2:18). Philo comments on this verse: "God is alone, a unity in the sense that His nature is simple not

[32] "Allegorical Interpretation," III, 61, in Works, I, 419.
[33] Philosophy of the Church Fathers, I, 293, 586.
[34] Wolfson, Philo, I, 325 ff.
[35] Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, I, 192.
[36] Adversus Praxeam, 5 and 7 as cited in Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 195.
[37] Adversus Praxeam, 5 and 7; Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 198.

composite, whereas each one of us and of all other created beings is made up of many things. . . . But God is not a composite Being, consisting of many parts, nor is he mixed with aught else." [38] In the same way the church father Hippolytus, who follows Philo's two-stage theory of the Logos, argues that "God subsisted 'alone' and had 'nothing contemporaneous with himself' and 'beside Him there was nothing,'" although he had his reason — that is, the pre-existent Logos.[39] Milton, then, had good patristic authority when he had God assert in Paradise Lost that he is "alone / From all eternity" (VIII, 205 f.).

Did God will the creation of the Logos when it came to exist in its second stage? Again we turn to Philo, who states that "the Logos together with the intelligible world came into their second stage of existence prior to the creation of the world by the will of God." [40] And again we find the same point of view in the early fathers, Tertullian, for instance, arguing that the generation of the Logos took place "as soon as God willed (*voluit*) to put forth into their respective substances and forms the things which He had planned and ordered within himself." [41] Similar quotations can be found in Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus, Hippolytus, and Clement of Alexandria. Milton obviously follows this conception throughout the Christian Doctrine as well as in Paradise Lost. Thus "The generation of the Son . . . arose from no natural necessity. . . . For questionless, it was in God's power consistently with the perfection of his own essence not to have begotten the Son" (XIV, 185, 187). Or more generally in Paradise Lost, God asserts that "Necessity and Chance / Approach not mee, and what I will is Fate" (VII, 172 f.).

A final point of some concern is the distinction between *begetting* and *creating*. Milton seems to confuse these and similar terms deliberately when he says that "God of his own will created [*creavit*], or generated [*generavit*], or produced [*produxit*] the

[38] "Allegorical Interpretation," II, 1, in Works, I, 225–227; cf. Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 194.

[39] Contra Haeresim Noetim 10; Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 194.

[40] As summarized in Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 223.

[41] Adversus Praxeam, 6; Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 224. As he notes, the seventeenth century was perfectly aware of the question: cf. Dionysius Petavius, De Trinitate, VI, 8, 1 ff., in his De Theologicis Dogmaticis, Paris (1644–50). He might have cited the Christian Doctrine just as well.

Son" (XIV, 193); likewise the Holy Spirit "was created [*creatum*] or produced [*productum*]" from the divine substance (XIV, 403). But Milton is being neither vague nor devious: his willingness to use these various words as synonyms stems from the fact that the Greek words for "beget" and "create" are actually identical, though some writers tried to distinguish them by a single *ν*: γεννητός and γενητός.[42] We have a clear example here of the inadequacy of the early theological vocabulary to distinguish an important issue. For, in modern terminology, if Christ is "begotten" he should be worshipped as God; if he is "created" he is merely one other created being and it would be heretical for any Christian to worship him.[43] Milton, however, knew what he was doing when he deliberately used those synonyms. His thought here was guided by two principles: first, as he says many times, both Son and Spirit are derived from the divine substance — not from a nondivine being as, for instance, in Plato's Timaeus the Demiourgos fashions the universe from non-Demiourgos materials. Second, according to Aristotle, "man begets man"; that is, "everything that is produced is something produced from something and by something, and that the same in species as it."[44] Thus the divine godhead would generate from itself another divinity. Since Milton's readers would be perfectly familiar with both of these doctrines, he did not find it necessary to urge a distinction which the earliest patristic vocabulary did not adequately render. He could use any of these synonyms, then, with the knowledge that his readers would not misunderstand him and believe that he was asserting that the Logos was a mere creature in the modern sense of the word.

So much for the Philonic two-stage Logos and some of its implications for early Christians who were trying to understand the

[42] Cf. the discussion in G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, London (1956), pp. 135 ff. The Greek word ποιέω is not involved here: the Nicene Creed had disposed of it once and for all. So also the Latin *facio*.

[43] The Second Ecumenical Council at Constantinople (381) seems to have decided that γεννηθέντα (begotten) be used in connection with the Son and ἐκπορευόμενον (proceeding) with the Holy Spirit.

[44] Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, 1032a25 and 1049b27–8. See Wolfson's stimulating discussion in Philosophy, I, 289 ff., where he distinguishes the artisan, antimythological creation (such as Plato's demiourgos) from the Judaeo-Christian artisan, mythological creation.

opening of the Johannine gospel.[45] We may notice that "while the exponents of the twofold theory could speak of the Logos as eternal, they could not speak of the generation as eternal; the generation as conceived by them had a beginning." [46] But it must be stressed that this two-stage Logos did not make any sense in the later-developing neoplatonism. There Mind emanated in one stage from eternity. Probably it was neoplatonism which thus led Origen and Irenaeus to develop the theory of an eternal, single-stage generation of the Logos, the theory which Christians generally hold today.[47] According to this theory the generation of the Logos "is as eternal and everlasting as the brightness which is produced from the sun," [48] as Origen asserts. Accordingly he argues against the view that "there once was a time when He was not the Son [for] there never was a time when He was not." [49] In this view the Logos never existed merely as an idea in God's mind — an existence which implies denial of any person. Nor was there a point of its generation in time. "In the beginning," at the opening of the Fourth Gospel means "from all eternity," as Theophilus had interpreted it.[50] Under the impact of the new single-stage theory the two-fold one slowly disappeared from Christian thought.

With this intellectual background of neoplatonism and the philosophy of Philo as adopted by the early Christian fathers, it will be instructive to examine the teachings of Arius to see just what his heresy meant in the early years of the church. The historical fact seems to be that in the early church there were various conceptions of the Trinity. Arius had the fortune, or misfortune, to precipitate the issue and to force its resolution through the first of the Ecumenical Councils, that of Nicaea.

Among the choices available to Arius in the interpretation of the Trinity was, of course, that of the Apologists which has been outlined above as a development from Philo. Arius followed it in

[45] It should be noted that this argument does not depend upon Wolfson's interpretation of Philo. See his Philo, I, 239, for other opinions. But Wolfson's is clear, cogent, and an excellent basis for understanding the patristic writers.

[46] Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 200.

[47] Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 198 ff.

[48] Origen, De Principiis, I, 2, 4; Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 201.

[49] Origen, De Principiis, IV, 4, 1; Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 201 f.

[50] Ad Autolycum, II, 22; Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 197.

part: he refused to accept the idea that the Logos has been eternally generated. Instead he utilized the two-fold theory which had been so widely accepted down to Irenaeus and Origen. Second, like Philo, he argued that in so producing the Son the Father had acted at a point in time of his own free will. Third, again like Philo, he argued that the Logos was created by God from nothing (*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*) and was thus merely part of creation in general. Like Philo's Logos Arius' Son was not truly God: "the Logos is not true God; though it is called God, yet it is not true God, but, by participation of grace, as all others, it is called God only in name." [51] As a consequence of this point, the spiritual difference between Father and Son became great — so great, indeed, that one could argue that the whole concept of a triune God had disappeared. As Athanasius observes of Arianism, "The substances of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are separate in nature, and estranged and disconnected, and alien, and without participation of each other." [52]

So with this third assertion the fat was in the fire. Followers of Arius were being asked to worship God's creation rather than divinity itself. The doors to pantheism were wide open. It is small wonder that the early church reacted violently. All of Arius' opponents joined to agree that the Logos had not been created *ex nihilo*. This and only this point was condemned as heresy at Nicaea. The reactions to the other two points named above — the willed generation in two stages — are interesting and instructive. Neither involved questioning the divinity of the Logos and so neither was declared anathema. We have already seen as to the first point that the Apologists from Justin Martyr through Lactantius had accepted the two-stage theory of the Word, with an implied unequal Trinity in many of the fathers as in Philo and Plotinus. But the theory was never banned: it is recognized now as subordinationism.[53] Gradually the single-stage theory prevailed, though as has been shown it was a later development.

Arius' consideration that the divine will was free produced many arguments. Some righteous Christians, in order to oppose

[51] Athanasius, Orationes contra Arianos, I, 6; Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 586 f.
[52] Athanasius, Orationes, I, 6; Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 244.
[53] See Prestige's discussion, Chapter VII.

anything savoring of Arianism, tended to deny the activity of the divine will with regard to the production of the Logos, which they held had been generated from eternity. At its extreme this would become exactly the position of the neoplatonists: Plotinus asserts just such a determinate and eternal emission of Mind from the One. But Christians dared not go quite so far toward a God bound by necessity; instead they developed the theory that it is simply the divine *nature* to beget the Logos from eternity.[54] Even so, many fathers, such as Eusebius, Gregory of Nyssa, Irenaeus, and Origen, agreed with Arius' statement that the Logos "came to be by the Divine will," despite the fact that they bitterly opposed him on the idea that the Logos is generated ἐξ ὀυκ ὄντων. Thus both the two-stage Logos theory and the limitation upon the divine freedom entirely escaped condemnation at Nicaea.

A last question concerned the generation of the Holy Spirit. In Tertullian and Origen and many other writers the Father generates the Son and the Son the Spirit — as One generates Mind, which generates Soul in Plotinus. But the Council of Constantinople agreed (in the "Nicene" Creed) that the Spirit "proceedeth from the Father." It is interesting to note that Milton deliberately remains silent about the matter (XIV, 357–359).

The distinction of the persons on a graded scale, as has been presented, does not mean in any sense that the Trinity does not act and think as a unit. The Logos is indeed distinct from the Father in number, but his thoughts must, of course, be the same as those of the Father. This view, established as early as Justin Martyr from Aristotelian terminology,[55] was held by Christians of all shades of opinion. The fathers considered that in the exercise of their different wills all members of the Trinity would act as a unit: the Trinity is a unity of rule. Such different writers as Origen, Basil, and Augustine affirm this doctrine; [56] as Milton writes, the Father and Son "are one, inasmuch as they speak and act with unanimity" (XIV, 211).

[54] See e.g. Athanasius, Orationes, III, 60; Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 227 ff.
[55] See Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 310.
[56] Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 313–59.

IV

Finally, the seventeenth century. Many of the intellectual leaders at Cambridge University, where Milton received his education, turned to Platonism as a means of interpreting their Christian beliefs; interested in a universal religion, too, they found in these pagans ideas which they eagerly equated with Christian ones in order to show the universality of the Christian revelation which long antedated (though in a confused and obscure way) the revelation of the New Testament. Thus according to Cudworth, one of this group, the revelation was first made "amongst the Hebrews . . . , and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other nations." He does not find it surprising that this early trinity was not identical with that formulated by the Nicene Council, since "this mystery was gradually imparted to the world, and that first but sparingly to the Hebrews themselves . . . but afterwards more fully under Christianity." [57] Cudworth and his contemporaries hopelessly confused Platonism proper with the later development which we know as neoplatonism; almost everyone in the seventeenth century argued freely from either source as though they were quite synonymous, to the helpless amazement of the modern student. It is not surprising, however, to discover them using such pagan sources to illuminate the difficulties of the Christian dogma.[58]

Thus in 1642 and again in 1647 Henry More, a Cambridge fellow, published poems which implicitly or explicitly state the similarities between the two systems. Instead of the Platonist's One-Mind-Soul trinity, More uses the terms Ahad, Æon, and Psyche in his Psychozoia. In an address "To the Reader" he points out the "correspondencies betwixt the Platonick Triad, and

[57] Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, London (1845), II, 313–314.

[58] Even Sir John Suckling noted the parallel. Regarding the Trinity, he wrote, "I observe in those great lovers and lords of reason, quoted by the fathers, Zoroastes, Trismegistus, Plato, Numenius, Plotinus, Proclus, Amelius, and Avicen, that when they spoke of this mystery of the Trinity, of which all writ something, and some almost as plainly as Christians themselves, that they discussed it not as they did other things, but delivered them, as oracles which they had received themselves, without dispute." From "A Discourse of Religion," in The Poems, Plays, and Other Remains, ed. W. C. Hazlitt, London (1892), II, 252.

diverse passages of Scripture. . . . Take in the whole Trinity, you shall find a strange concordance and harmony betwixt the nature of each Hypostasis in either of their order." [59] In Stanza 4 of Canto I he names Plato and Plotinus as the sources of genuine Platonism, supported by Pythagoras, Hermes Trismegistus, and the Chaldean Oracles — "all which time hath tore / But Plato and deep Plotin do restore." Stanzas 8 and 9 go on to state that "*Ahad* of himself the *Æon* fair / Begot, the brightnesse of his father's grace. . . . This is that ancient *Eidos* omniform, / Fount of all beauty." [60]

But Ralph Cudworth deserves recognition among the group for having presented the clearest (if by no means the most succinct) account of Christianity in Platonic terms. Chapter IV of his True Intellectual System of the Universe is almost entirely given over to an elaborate history of the Platonic movement and a labored reconciliation of it with Christianity. The basic theory — or delusion — from which he worked was that the true Christian Trinity had been revealed to Moses and via him to Plato. Later Platonists were then responsible for its adulteration, although he is forced to quote almost entirely in support of his thesis, of course, from Plotinus and other late Platonists. Thus he finds that some neoplatonists consider the third person to be the *anima mundi*, which can hardly correspond to the Christian Holy Spirit, but decides that Plotinus, Aemelius, and Porphyrius had the true notion of the Third Person.[61] Yet even Porphyrius had gone astray in declaring that Mind was "self-begotten" — which the Christian Son was not — and "by way of natural and necessary emanation"

[59] From the 1647 edition. In 1642 he had argued that "the platonists, the best and divinest of Philosophers, and the Christians, the best of all that do professe religion, do both concur that there is a Trinity." Both editions of "To the Reader" make extensive and detailed comparisons between the two trinities.

[60] In his notes upon this canto, More observes that "*Ahad*, *Æon*, *Psyche*, the Platonic Triad, is rather . . . the Divinity rather than the Deity." From the "one indivisible unmovable self-born Unity" come "Wisdome, Intellect, *Æon*, *On*, or *Autocalon*, or in a word, the Intellectual world." One can sympathize with Paul Shorey's comment in Platonism Ancient and Modern, Berkeley, Calif. (1938), p. 40, upon "the imperturbable self-assurance of the Neo-Platonic type of mind — the almost comic innocent serenity with which these 'babe-like Jupiters,' in Emerson's phrase, . . . sit on their clouds and from age to age prattle to each other and to no contemporary." Or perhaps he would prefer Dodds' epithet of the "Wissenschaft des Nichtwissenwerthan," Elements, p. ix.

[61] II, 347–9. His "authority" for the latter statement is Proclus.

— which cannot harmonize with the Christian conception of a God exercising free will (II, 371).

In his "Platonic" statement of the Christian Trinity, Cudworth generally follows Plotinus, calling in at the same time various other neoplatonists and church fathers to witness to the different details of the scheme. Thus he admits that the Platonic trinity is one of subordination of the second and third members: the "fundamental principle of their theology [is] that there is but one Original of all things . . . from whence all other things whatsoever, whether temporal or eternal, created or uncreated, were altogether derived. And therefore this second hypostasis of their trinity, since it must accordingly derive its whole being from the first . . . must of necessity have also an essential dependence upon the same; and consequently, a gradual subordination to it." [62] Mind is accordingly different in its being from the One (II, 391), and this difference and inferiority give difficulty to the Christian interpreter (II, 395). Moreover, the second person must receive its essence from the first: "the second [must] needs derive its whole essence from [the first], and be generated after another manner, namely, in a way of natural emanation" (II, 400). Cudworth admits that the persons differ in essence: "notwithstanding must it be acknowledged, that [the Platonists] nowhere suppose each of these three hypostases to be numerically the very same, or to have no distinct singular essences of their own; this being, in their apprehensions, directly contradictious to their very hypothesis itself" (II, 431–2); but he goes on to argue that *substance* in this context is "synonymous with essence"; accordingly the Trinity possess the same substance but differ in their hypostases or persons (II, 432).

Another difficulty with the Christian interpretation of the Platonic trinity is the rôle to assign the second or third persons in creation. Plato's Demiurge of the Timaeus, which created the universe, was identified with Mind by some and with Soul by

[62] II, 399; see also p. 390. As George Rust observes in A Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen and the Chief of His Opinions, London (1661), p. 16: "There seems such a necessity of nature that all Effects and Productions whatever, whether *voluntary* or *emanative*, should decline something from the supereminent Excellency of the Cause and Producer, that it is scarce possible to keep our mindes from thinking but that the Rule holds also in the *Divine Emanations*."

others. Cudworth considers that "according to the genuine and ancient Platonic doctrine, all these three hypostases were the joint-creators of the whole world" (II, 388). Or the Soul is "That which doth actively display, and produce into being, what was virtually or potentially contained in the first; and ideally or exemplarily in the second" (II, 393).

Cudworth was on safer ground when he argued that the Platonic trinity is eternal, although the theory of emanation seemed to him to imply a beginning in time and some Platonists, such as Macrobius, so interpreted it (II, 374). But the majority agree that this emanation is a timeless process, without beginning or end, and Cudworth makes much of this fact in equating the two trinities. Accordingly, the only real differences that he discovers are those of equality and identity of essence: he quotes with approval the observation of Cyril of Alexandria that "There would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonic trinity for an absolute agreement of it with the Christian, had they but accommodated the right notion of co-essentiality or consubstantiality to their three hypostases" (II, 434). Accordingly, he can argue that "though some of the latter Platonists have partly misunderstood, and partly adulterated that ancient Cabala of the Trinity . . . , yet did Plato himself, and some of his genuine followers (though living before Christianity) approach so near to the doctrine thereof, as in some manner to correspond therewith. . . . First, in not making a mere trinity of names and words . . . but a trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons. Secondly, in making none of their three hypostases to be creatures, but all eternal. . . . Lastly, in supposing these three divine hypostases . . . to be essentially one divinity. From whence it may be concluded, that as Arianism is commonly supposed to approach nearer to the truth of Christianity than Plotinianism, so is Platonism undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than Arianism; it being a certain middle thing betwixt that and Sabellianism, which in general was that mark the Nicene council also aimed at" (II, 409).

As a result of Cudworth's intense interest in Platonism, we are not surprised to find him interpreting the generation of the Logos as a single-stage manifestation, produced from eternity but not *ex nihilo*. As Cudworth remarks, "Arius maintained, the Son or

Word [was] a creature, made in time . . . of a different essence or substance from the Father" (II, 439). Instead Cudworth urges Athanasius' views: "Christ was the Son of God, and not from nothing . . . ; the Son was out of the substance of God, thereby to distinguish him from all created beings" (II, 440–1). But the fact that the neoplatonic trinity was produced without will but as a necessary emanation is a fact with which Cudworth seems not to have come to real grips. He does apparently accept, with some hesitation and some indecision, the inequality inherent in the pagan trinity as acceptable for a "Christian Platonist."

The issue has frequently been raised as to whether this kind of Platonizing of the Trinity was really the Arian heresy. With the immense experience behind him of editing a number of neoplatonic works, the Jesuit Dionysius Petavius, or Denis Petau (1583–1652), was vigorously arguing just this point in the 1640's.[63] Cudworth simply answers that "Petavius (though otherwise learned and industrious) was herein grossly mistaken," for "Arius was no Platonist at all" (II, 372). He adds that "the chief ground of Petavius' mistake . . . was his not distinguishing betwixt that spurious trinity of some Platonists" and the genuine one.[64] Instead, he tries to show that "Arius did not so much Platonize, as the Nicene fathers and Athanasius" (II, 389). Cudworth correctly argues that such a "gradual subordination of the second hypostasis to the first, and of the third to the first and second" can be found in the Apologists whose views were presented above: Justin Martyr, Tatian, Tertullian, Clement, Origen, and Lactantius (II, 417). We have seen that he can be justified in this view.[65] He can accordingly conclude that "the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity was doubtless anti-Arian, or else the Arian trinity anti-Platonic" (II, 458).

Should we then consider Cudworth (and, by implication, many of his fellow Platonists at Cambridge) to be involved in formal heresy in this view of the Trinity? These divines themselves certainly considered themselves orthodox, describing the true Trinity of early Christianity, for which they found authority in church

[63] See his De Trinitate, II.

[64] II, 374 f. See also his editor Mosheim's long note to the passage.

[65] Cudworth is quite well aware too that Philo is somehow related to the question. See, e.g., II, 316, 320, etc.

fathers and in reason. But the argument, begun in the seventeenth century, is not dead yet. In 1666 Samuel Parker, for instance, believed correctly that the entire doctrine of a neoplatonic trinity originated long after Plato and is not central to his philosophy. He strongly questions too that Plato received his "theological theories" from Moses, even though everyone else agrees that this belief is true. Instead, "The first Author of this mistake seems to have been *Ammonius of Alexandria* . . . who being both a Christian and a Platonist, & lighting upon these *Spurious Books*, in which the *Platonick Notions* and *Christian Articles* were blended and reconciled" took over the idea.[66] Later opponents charged flat heresy. Dean Inge observes that Cudworth's "equation of the Neoplatonic divine hypostases with the Christian Trinity not only fails, but involves the writer in formal heresy."[67] On the contrary, Ernst Cassirer judges that "The Cambridge Platonists are neither deists nor, as their adversaries constantly charged them with being, Arminians, Arians, or Socinians. They are plain religious moralists."[68] The fact is that no church council has ever pronounced their views of the Trinity to be heresy.

Milton's place in the scheme of the Trinity which has been outlined should be clear. In many ways his views agree with those of Cudworth and the Cambridge men. There is, of course, no trace of the neoplatonic One-Mind-Soul terminology in the Christian Doctrine — and could not be because of the nature of the treatise. But the Son and Spirit are clearly degenerating emanations differing in degree from the Father and "created or generated or produced" from his substance. Milton, in common with all Christians, rejects the origin of the Logos ἐξ ὀυκ ὄντων — whether it be the Philonic or the Arian. In doing so he avoided the real charge of heresy which could be brought against him. On the other hand, he departed from neoplatonism and from the Cambridge group in rejecting certain of their teachings.

First, unlike Plotinus, he held that the Father is completely free in willing the generation of the Logos. In this he is like

[66] A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophie, Oxford (1666), pp. 93, 109.

[67] The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought, London (1926), p. 58.

[68] The Platonic Renaissance in England, trans. James P. Pettegrove, Austin, Texas (1953), p. 38.

Arius, but he also agrees with Philo and with most of the fathers of the church.

Second, and of extreme importance, he returned to the two-stage conception of the Logos which had been put forward originally by Philo and then had been accepted and expounded by a highly respectable group of church fathers — among the earliest writers of the Christian church. We may surmise that Milton returned to them with the principle which has always motivated the thinking of puritan Protestantism: the desire to establish church doctrines and practices as close as possible to those of the most primitive Christian church. Accordingly, we may discover that the Logos which he describes in the Christian Doctrine exists in two different manifestations — the Philonian two-stage Logos — though this fact seems to have been overlooked before. The treatise actually describes these two manifestations.

Milton divides God's "efficiency" into "internal" and "external." God, that is, may be active within himself or outside himself. His "internal efficiency" is "that which is independent of all extraneous agency." This "internal efficiency" Milton denominates as God's "decrees." The latter may be either "general" or "special." We are not concerned here with his "general" decrees except to note that they have been decreed "from all eternity" (XIV, 63). But we are concerned with his "special decrees," and Milton observes that "the first and most important is that which regards his Son, and from which he primarily derives his name of Father. . . . It appears that the Son of God was begotten by the decree of the Father" (XIV, 89). Thus Chapter III of the Christian Doctrine.

At the beginning of Chapter V, "Of the Son of God," Milton begins a consideration of God's "external efficiency, or the execution of his decrees." Under this head occurs "generation," and under it "in pursuance of his decree [he] has begotten his only Son." Moreover, this generation "must be an external efficiency" (XIV, 179). Now clearly these two passages are describing two very different activities of the Father: the begetting of the Son in Chapter III is a "special internal efficiency," whereas that in V is an "external efficiency." Milton, it seems evident, is following the theory which Wolfson has called the "two stage" instead

of the more traditional "one stage." He has perfectly good ecclesiastical authority, as we have seen, for this view. One may even argue that the internal Son or Logos of Chapter III has existed from eternity, though Milton does not say one way or the other. The second stage is, of course, limited in its beginning; but the first may well not be; at least the "general internal decrees" exist "from all eternity." The character of Sin in Paradise Lost may furnish evidence too. As has been remarked often, Milton deliberately paralleled his holy Trinity with the unholy one fathered by Satan. Sin apparently is conceived as undergoing a "two-stage" existence in parallel with that of the Logos: she exists as an idea in Satan's mind and then at a moment in time springs from his head as a real being (II, 755–58).[69]

Thus the various "Arian" passages in the Christian Doctrine and Paradise Lost fall into place as revelations of a tradition which antedates even the Council of Nicaea. It seems that we may assert positively that Milton was not an Arian.[70] Subordinationism as such has not been branded heretical, though it is not the view of the Trinity found most widely today — or in the seventeenth century for that matter. As Milton himself observes (XIV, 357), his view of the Son agrees with the faith expressed in the Apostles' Creed; he might also have added the Nicene Creed. The equality of the persons of the Trinity was not officially affirmed at Nicaea and never has been; neither was the eternal generation of the Logos. With regard to the anathematized ἐξ ὐκ ὄντων Milton stands with all other orthodox Christians. Like his Cambridge contemporaries, Milton was doing his best to present a theory of the Trinity which would harmonize with reason, with a historical and respected philosophy, with the utterances of the primitive Christian church which have always been held in high respect by most Protestants, and with the Bible. These seventeenth century thinkers were grappling with ideas, not

[69] Again Tertullian (Adversus Hermogenem, 3) offers a suggestive parallel: "There was, however, a time when neither sin nor the Son was." Cf. Wolfson, Philosophy, I, 586 n.

[70] Philip Schaff, perhaps alone among nineteenth century scholars, reaches the same conclusion. Milton, he says, cannot properly be termed an Arian; his system of ideas is "totally different" from that of Arius. History of the Christian Church, New York (1867), II, 640 n.

with dogma; and they refused to agree blindly with Christian assertions no matter how venerable if they were not supported by biblical texts and reason. As Cassirer observes, in their stress upon a reasonable approach to religion, "The Cambridge thinkers are very far from that kind of rationalism which becomes prevalent in the eighteenth century in the systems of English deism." Milton places perhaps more emphasis upon the Bible as authority, but he must to some degree be included in the group. Creeds alone did not suit his needs. To arrive at an understanding of the most difficult mystery of Christianity, the Trinity, he relied upon scriptural authority interpreted in the light of patristic and philosophical formulations presented by reason. For, as Henry More wrote, "Take away Reason . . . and all religions are alike true." [71]

[71] Cassirer, pp. 30, 84. The last quotation is from More's "General Preface" to A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings, London (1662), p. vi.

THE NAME OF THE CHURCH OF ST. SOPHIA IN CONSTANTINOPLE

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ALL scholars who have been concerned with the Church of St. Sophia in Constantinople have noticed that different sources sometimes give it different names, or different forms of the same name. A certain number of examples of the usage of the ancient writers have been collected and have been available in the current works of reference,[1] but these published lists are not exhaustive. Having had occasion to make a study of the name of the church as given by Nikolaos Mesarites, the present writer has made a collection of examples which appears to be larger than any hitherto published, and it is hoped that the *testimonia* assembled here may give scholars a better understanding of the conception which the ancient writers had of the dedication of the church and the significance of the designations which were applied to it.

The church was at most periods commonly called ἡ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία, as were the principal churches of other cities, such as Antioch and Alexandria.[2] Socrates (ca. 380–439) in his Eccle-

[1] See for example Du Cange, Constantinopolis Christiana (Paris, 1680), Book III, pp. 6–7 (it should be remembered that several important texts had not yet been published in Du Cange's time), and La Géographie ecclésiastique de l'empire byzantin. I^ere^ partie, Le siège de Constantinople et le patriarcat oecuménique. Tome III, Les églises et les monastères, par R. Janin (Paris, 1953), p. 471.

The writer has been unable to discover any evidence for the date at which churches began to have individual names. At Constantinople, for example, literary traditions of the fourth century and later contain allusions to churches of the second and third centuries which were named for individual saints, and the names of churches which began to be built in the time of Constantine the Great are recorded in texts which are not much later in date: see La géographie ecclésiastique de l'Empire byzantin. I^ere^ partie, Le siège de Constantinople et le patriarcat oecuménique, Tome III, Les églises et les monastères, par R. Janin (Paris, 1953), pp. 1–2. However, it was also a common usage even in large cities to speak of "the Great Church" or "the Old Church," as a common designation which everyone would understand (see the following note).

[2] Antioch: Malalas, 318,4; 324,9; 325,14; 419,21 Bonn ed.; Chrysostom, t. VI, p. 255 Montf. Alexandria: Malalas, 359,8–9. Procopius mentions "the Great Church" at Daras (De aed., II, iii, 26). Some of the bricks used at St. Sophia are stamped Μεγ(άλη)ς Ἐκκλ(ησία)ς; cf. E. H. Swift, Hagia Sophia (New York, 1940), p. 50, and C. A. Mango, Byzantine Brick Stamps, American Journal of Archaeology, LIV (1950), pp. 24, 26.

siastical History [3] says that this was the original designation of the church and that the name Σοφία came into use only at a later time: κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς (Constantius) τὴν μεγάλην ἐκκλησίαν ἔκτισεν, ἥτις Σοφία μὲν προσαγορεύεται νῦν. In his account of the dedication of the church in 360 [4] he calls it ἡ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία ὀνομαζομένη Σοφία. Procopius in his History of the Wars [5] mentions the name Σοφία as though it required some explanation: Βασιλίσκος δὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐς Βυζάντιον ἱκέτης ἐκάθητο ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν Χριστοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ (Σοφίαν καλοῦσιν οἱ Βυζάντιοι τὸν νεὼν, ταύτην δὴ μάλιστα τῷ θεῷ πρέπειν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἡγούμενοι). While the name ἡ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία continued in use, writers also began to speak of the church as ἡ Ἁγία Σοφία,[6] and τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Σοφίας.[7] Another variant is ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία.[8]

Some writers define Σοφία more closely, speaking of the church as ἡ Ἁγία Σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ.[9] The earliest example of this usage which the present writer has noted occurs in Nicetas Paphlagon,[10] who wrote about A.D. 890. In the tenth-century Life of St. Andrew the Simpleton by Nicephorus the church is called ἡ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία τῆς ἐπωνύμου Θεοῦ Σοφίας.[11] The Λόγος is introduced into the name apparently for the first time in Theophanes Continuatus, a compilation made between A.D. 813 and 916, in which there is a reference to τὸ μέγα τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου τέμενος.[12] The most elaborate form of the name, in which Σοφία and the Θεοῦ Λόγος are associated, occurs in Zonaras (who wrote about A.D. 1118), who speaks of τὸ μεγὰ τέμενος τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου Σοφίας,[13] or calls the church, more simply, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου Σοφία.[14] Mesar-

[3] II, 16, P.G. 67, 217.
[4] II, 43, P.G. 67, 356.
[5] III, 6, 26.
[6] E.g. Cedrenus, I, p. 753 Bonn; Theoph. Cont., p. 354, 1 Bonn.
[7] Ignatius, Life of Nicephorus, in Nicephori opuscula historica, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1880), p. 164, 8. A characteristic list of the various epithets applied to the church may be found in De Boor's Index, p. 249.
[8] Cedrenus, II, pp. 438, 609 Bonn. This designation is also found in Theoph. Cont., p. 399, 17–18 Bonn.
[9] Theoph. Cont., pp. 384,5–6, 402,15 Bonn; Zonaras, IV, p. 35 Dindorf; Georgius Monachus, p. 919,3–4 Bonn; Leo Diaconus, p. 95 Bonn.
[10] P.G. 105, 544–545.
[11] P.G. 111, 888 C.
[12] P. 154,6–7 Bonn.
[13] IV, p. 153 Dindorf.
[14] IV, pp. 123–124 Dindorf; see also IV, p. 35.

ites, about A.D. 1200, uses the full form of the title as found in Zonaras,[15] and Pachymeres, writing in the early fourteenth century, uses a similar title.[16] It is to be noted that individual authors use several forms of the name indifferently, e.g. Zonaras, whose employment of the most elaborate form has just been noted, also speaks of the church as *τὸ θεῖον τέμενος τοῦ μεγάλου ναοῦ, ὃν βασιλεὺς Κωνστάντιος ἐδομήσατο*,[17] *ἡ ἐκκλησία*,[18] *ἡ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία*.[19] Cedrenus speaks of *ἡ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία*,[20] *ἡ Ἁγία Σοφία*,[21] *ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία*.[22]

An aspect of *Σοφία* which does not appear in the literary sources is attested by an inscription of the post-iconoclastic period in the church itself, which refers to *ἡ ἀθάνατος Σοφία*. The inscription, in the south tympanum, was seen only in part at the time when the church was repaired a century ago. The portion recorded was read [. . .] AIΓTHCAΘANATOΥCOΦIAC. According to the record, about fourteen letters have been lost from the beginning of the inscription. Presumably the text made some statement to the effect that this building was dedicated to "deathless Wisdom." Whether this inscription was intended to replace an earlier inscription of the same purport, or whether the use of the epithet represented a conception which was new at the time when the inscription was set up, we do not know.[23]

The variations in the names which are applied to the church at various periods and by various writers, and especially the use by one writer of several forms of the name, all seem to indicate that a number of people at least were not certain just what the proper name of the church was. Since the church continued at all times to be called simply "the Great Church," as were the principal

[15] Nikolaos Mesarites, Description of the Church of the Holy Apostles at Constantinople, ed. and tr. by G. Downey, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, N.S., XLVII, pt. 6 (1957), p. 916, ch. 40 § 4.

[16] I, p. 318 Bonn.

[17] III, p. 271,3 Dindorf.

[18] III, p. 191 Dindorf.

[19] III, p. 328 Dindorf.

[20] I, p. 679, II, p. 338 Bonn.

[21] I, p. 753 Bonn.

[22] I, p. 650, II, pp. 438, 609 Bonn.

[23] The inscription is reproduced by W. Salzenberg, Altchristliche Baudenkmale von Konstantinopel (Berlin, 1854), p. 31. See S. G. Mercati, "Sulle iscrizioni di Santa Sofia," Bessarione, 1923, pp. 200–222.

churches of Alexandria and Antioch, it might look as though the original reason for the choice of the name Σοφία had been lost sight of. In these circumstances it seems possible that there might have come into existence varying conceptions as to the significance of the name, and it seems possible that the existence of different ideas is reflected in the appearance in later writers, several centuries after the foundation of the church, of the variant forms ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία, ἡ Ἁγία Σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου τέμενος, and τὸ τέμενος τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου Σοφίας.

From Procopius' explanation of the name, and Socrates' statement that in his own day the church was called Σοφία, to the inscription and the more elaborate forms of the name used by the chroniclers, there is a space of three or four centuries. Socrates either did not know exactly what the name meant, or (more likely) knew it so well that he did not trouble to explain it. Procopius, who is apparently the only writer who offers an explanation of the name, thought he knew what Σοφία meant, and also thought it interesting or necessary to explain it. The later chroniclers, however, while they find it natural to write of ἡ μεγάλη ἐκκλησία, also use the more elaborate forms (which they may often have taken over automatically from other sources) in which the church is ascribed to the Θεοῦ Λόγος or the τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου Σοφία. Evidently, when a church which is called simply ἡ Ἁγία Σοφία is also called τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου τέμενος, Σοφία is thought of as the same thing as ὁ Θεοῦ Λόγος. The significance of these longer forms of the name seems to be that they represent efforts to explain or make more precise a name which had become so familiar that its exact significance could be forgotten. Whether such efforts began to be made with some frequency only in the ninth and tenth centuries is a question which is difficult to settle because the literary evidence for the earlier periods is not complete and because the extant remains are not as abundant as the material which exists beginning with the ninth century.

The idea of Σοφία of course was much in the air at the time when the church was being built. Work was begun in 326,[24] the

[24] The Chronicon Paschale (p. 543,16 Bonn) states that the *encaenia* took place in 360, and adds that this was thirty-four years after the laying of the foundations (p. 544,14).

year after the convocation of the Council of Nicaea had turned the problem of the nature of Christ into the burning question of the day. In what respect was Christ Θεοῦ δύναμις καὶ Θεοῦ σοφία?[25] The nature of Christ as Σοφία became a matter of common knowledge to all who followed the debates, recent converts and old Christians alike.[26] Soteriou has suggested that it was the existence of the Arian controversy which caused the church to be dedicated to Σοφία.[27] This suggestion, though attractive, cannot be proved; but it seems plain that most of the writers who give the name of the church in detail believed that it was dedicated to the Σοφία of God as the second person of the Trinity,[28] and this is indicated by the inscription in the south tympanum. It must be remembered, however, that there is no evidence which shows specifically whether the church was originally dedicated to Σοφία or was considered merely to be the church of God or the church of Christ, and no extant evidence which shows why the dedication Σοφία was chosen at all. E. Ivanka has suggested that the dedications chosen for Constantine's churches at Constantinople were intended to commemorate the triad Δύναμις — Σοφία — Εἰρήνη.[29]

[25] I Cor. 1, 24; cf. ibid. 30; Prov. 8, 22.

[26] Cf. the discussions of the question in writings of Athanasius: Expos. fidei, 1, p. 79 (P.G. 25, 200); ibid., 4, p. 81 (col. 208); De decretis Nicaenae synodi, 14, p. 174 (P.G. 25, 441); ibid., 17, p. 175 (col. 444); De sententia Dionysii, 25, p. 205 (P.G. 25, 517); ibid., 26, p. 206 (col. 517); Orat. I contra Arianos, 28, p. 341 (P.G. 26, 69); Orat. II contra Arianos, 78, p. 432 (col. 312).

[27] G. A. Soteriou, Ἡ Ἁγία Σοφία (Athens, 1917), p. 10.

[28] Cf. Leclercq, art. "Byzance," Cabrol-Leclercq, Dict., II, 1419; A. M. Schneider, "Die vorjustinianische Sophienkirche," B.Z., XXXVI (1936), p. 79. E. H. Swift, Hagia Sophia (New York, 1940), p. 8, states that the church "was known at first simply as 'the great church.' Later it was dedicated to the Immortal Wisdom of Christ, Ἀθανάτῳ Σοφίᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ." This statement seems to be based on the inscription mentioned above. Attention may be called to the legend of the origin of the name preserved in the Anonymous of Banduri, Script. Orig. Constantinopol., I, pp. 85–88 Preger.

[29] "The Emperor Constantine's Conversion to Christianity in the Light of New Research" (in Hungarian), Theologia (Budapest), VI (1939), pp. 312–321.

NOMINALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF MEANING AS ILLUSTRATED BY PIERRE D'AILLY ON PREDESTINATION AND JUSTIFICATION

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IT IS difficult in our day to understand the appeal of late medieval nominalism [1] for it seems almost schizophrenic in the way it alternates between opposing emphases. It looked at every theological problem from two radically different points of view: from the perspective of God's absolute power, and from the viewpoint of what he has in fact ordained. In the first context, nominalism relied completely on the power of philosophy and logic to define (though not to prove) omnipotence, and insisted on the radically individualistic isolation of man before a God of absolute and arbitrary power; but in the second context, these emphases are in effect reversed and stress is laid on fideism, the community and its authority, and, in the case of many nominalists, on the moral autonomy of man *vis à vis* God. Furthermore, the reconciliation of these contrary tendencies is primarily logical, or even verbal. Yet nominalism so captivated the minds of many theologians that they were quite content with what seems to us a purely external and artificial unity and consistency.

This strength of nominalism has been accounted for by three kinds of explanation. One speaks of the "decadence" of scholasticism in the late middle ages, thus implying that nominalism prospered because the constructive spiritual and intellectual forces of the age were so weak that it turned away from the search for truth to destructive criticism.[2] It may be suggested that this is simply a way of saying that one disapproves of nominalism. Another, more illuminating, type of explanation describes nominal-

[1] It would be more accurate to call this movement of thought "Ockhamism," "terminism" (the usual medieval designation), or, as Ph. Boehner suggests, "realistic conceptualism" ("The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," Traditio, IV, 1946, 307–335), for this so-called "nominalism" never asserted that universals are merely names, nor denied that universal concepts convey truthful knowledge of external reality.

[2] A good summary statement of the objections to such a view is found in E. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age, Paris, 1947, p. 591.

ism, with its emphases on individuality and on divine freedom, as an extreme defensive reaction against the threat to Christianity posed by the Greek and Arabic combination of a realistic view of universal essences with naturalistic determinism.[3] This is certainly part of the truth, but scarcely the whole. In the third place, certain recent writers insist on the positive strengths of nominalism, the points at which it constituted a genuine advance over previous thought.[4] We shall, in the last part of this paper, return to this answer and attempt to sketch more comprehensively than has heretofore been done both the value and the limitations of the nominalist contribution.

I

First, however, we shall illustrate the problem we are trying to solve by showing that there is within the thought of Pierre d'Ailly on predestination and justification a conflict between his nominalism and what he would like to say on other grounds. This will enable us better to appreciate the need for an explanation of the adherence of men like Ailly to a position which forced on them what must seem to us in our day highly artificial solutions to highly artificial problems.

Other illustrations could have been chosen, but the one we have selected does have the advantage of being both important in itself and previously unstudied.[5] Luther appears to have had a better acquaintance with the writings of Pierre d'Ailly than with those of any other scholastic except Gabriel Biel.[6] Ailly's treatment of predestination was one of the most widely read in the

[3] A representative example of such an interpretation is that of A. Maurer, "Scotism and Ockhamism," in A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. V. Ferm, New York, 1950, 212–226.

[4] See especially studies by E. Moody and Ph. Boehner listed in "Ockham-Literatur 1919–1949," Franziskanische Studien, XXXII (1950), 164–183.

[5] Incidental references are to be found in various writers, but no extended studies. P. Vignaux paraphrases parts of Ailly's I Sent., q. 9, which deals in part with justification, but does not touch on his doctrine of predestination. See P. Vignaux, Luther, Commentateur des Sentences, Paris, 1935, 79–81, 98–99, 100–105.

[6] In the preface to the second volume of the Opera of Luther, Wittenberg, 1546, Melancthon says of the Reformer, "Gabrielem et Cammeracensem [i.e., Ailly] pene ad verbum memoriter recitare poterat." O. Scheel, Dokumente zu Luthers Entwicklung, 2 Aufl., Tübingen, 1929, text 532, p. 199, 1.37. Cf. H. Denifle, Luther und Luthertum in ersten Entwicklung, 2 Bd., Mayence, 1904, 501, 571, 589, etc.

fifteenth century.[7] Its neglect may seem surprising but perhaps scholars have not found in it anything sufficiently distinctive to justify separate examination. It is easy to understand such a reaction, and yet an attentive reading of the texts shows that Pierre d'Ailly wanted to say something fundamentally at variance with the influential nominalists whose teaching on these doctrines have been studied: namely, his predecessors, William of Ockham and Gregory of Rimini, and his successor, Gabriel Biel.[8] Nevertheless, he did not succeed in really differing with these men, and so his distinctive opinions emerge simply as slight variations in nuance and emphasis.

Pierre d'Ailly attempts to stand between Ockham's tendency toward Pelagianism, on the one hand, and, on the other, Gregory of Rimini's twofold insistence on man's total moral incapacity and on something rather like double predestination.[9] Against Gregory, Ailly tries to say that God reprobates those who are lost because they have sinned, rather than for no reason at all; while against Ockham he wishes to deny that God's foreknowledge of human merits may ever be said to be the cause of predestination. On the doctrine of justification, or, more precisely, on the question of man's natural capacity to do the good and the necessity of grace, Pierre d'Ailly does not mention any names, but his phraseology indicates that here also he had Gregory and Ockham in mind. In opposition to Gregory, he asserts that there is a sense in which man by his natural power can do some good and even love God; but, on the other hand, Ockham goes too far when he says that human beings are naturally and independently capable of doing anything which God commands. Furthermore, he is not satisfied with Ockham's very general statement that some sort of divine help is necessary in order to prepare for the reception of

[7] "La multiplicité des éditions de Pierre d'Ailly de 1484 à 1504 nous montre que . . . le Commentaire du Cardinal de Cambrai avait gardé jusqu'au début du XVI[e] siècle une véritable autorité." M. Patronnier de Gandillac, "Usage et valeur des arguments probables chez Pierre d'Ailly," Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et Littéraire du M.–A., VIII, 1933, p. 44, fn. 1.

[8] For the first two, see P. Vignaux, Justification et Prédestination au XIV[e] Siècle, and M. Schüler, Prädestination Sünde und Freiheit bei Gregor von Rimini, Stuttgart, 1934; for the last, C. Feckes, Die Rechfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel und ihre Stellung innerhalb der nominalistischen Schüle, Münster, 1925.

[9] On Ockham's "Pelagianism," see P. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc. 123–127; on Gregory of Rimini, ibid., 153–175.

justifying grace [10] but, apparently wishing to exclude the view that man needs only a general, rather than a special supernatural, assistance in order to turn to God, he specifies the necessity of prevenient mercy.[11] In short, the formulae our author favors are the single predestinarian ones of Duns Scotus [12] and, we might add, of the Formula of Concord,[13] while in speaking as if man has a natural ability to do some good he sounds rather Thomistic.[14]

We are accustomed to think of these as central issues. We assume that a theologian's options on these points will have a decisive influence on the whole of his thought, and so it is disconcerting to discover that this is not in the least true of Pierre d'Ailly, nor of late medieval nominalists in general. He himself recognizes, indeed emphasizes, that his disagreements with other nominalists on these matters is more verbal than real, and this despite the fact that these disagreements were of considerable importance to him.

It is not, I think, difficult to understand why he thought them important. Despite his mastery of logical subtlties, he was a practical man, a writer of works of popular devotion,[15] a prince of the church with large ecclesiastical responsibilities, and so he was sensitive to the impression theological statements make on the popular mind. He admits, for example, that none of the morally good acts of those who are eventually damned are accepted by God as meritorious, but then he adds, "this does not sound well

[10] Ockham, In primum librum Sententiarum, Lyon, 1495, d. 41, q. 1, C. E. Iserloh suggests that this passage, which speaks of the need for "auxilium divinum," expresses an opinion which is not that of Ockham himself, Gnade und Eucharistie in der Philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm von Ockham, Wiesbaden, 1956, pp. 120 f.

[11] Pierre d'Ailly, Questiones super primum, tertium et quartam Sententiarum, Paris, 1491, lib. I, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 176 E (henceforth cited as I Sent. q. 12, a. 1, 176 E): ". . . in peccatoribus precedit aliquid quo digni sint iustificatione, etc. Dicendum hoc dupliciter posse intelligi. Uno modo quod illud tale peccatores habeant a se: et sic est illud falsum. Alio modo quod illud habeant ex preveniente misericordia dei: et sic est illud verum." Documentation of the previously mentioned views of Ailly is given below.

[12] John Duns Scotus, Commentaria Oxoniensia, ed. M. F. Garcia, Quaracchi, 1912, lib. I, d. 41, q.un., n. 11, p. 1257. Cf. Vignaux, Predestination, etc., 24 ff.

[13] Art. XI, Affirmitiva, n. 4–14. P. Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, New York, 1877, vol. III, 166–170.

[14] Cf., e.g., Summa Theologica II–II, q. 109, a. 4.

[15] E. Vansteenberghe, "Un 'Programme de vie' de la fin du moyen âge," Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters (Beiträge z. Gesch. der Phil. u. Th. des Mittelalters, Supplementband III/2) Münster, 1935, 1231–1246.

in the ears of the multitude." [16] We may safely assume that this was also one of the reasons he wished to exclude double predestination, as well as statements which are either so optimistic about human goodness as to lead to pride, or so pessimistic as to induce moral defeatism. In his own mind, at least, he was a defender of what may, not too inappropriately, be called the "simple gospel." This astonishes the readers of his formidably technical works, but the Prologue attached to the first printed edition of his Commentary on the Sentences makes it quite clear that he thought of the nominalists as the group which avoids the useless and dangerous excursions into secular philosophy practised by other theologians. He says that the nominalists, unlike others, go to adore the poor infant in his manger, recognizing the impotence of profane science to reveal the divine secret,[17] and so he adheres to their school in spite of differences with some of its representatives.

The verbal character of these differences is well illustrated by his treatment of the problem of what man can do by his own purely natural powers, that is, *ex puris naturalibus*. It is necessary, he says, to distinguish two meanings of the question, for it may refer either to a nature which simply lacks the inward qualitative transformation accomplished by infused grace, or, on the other hand, it may denote a nature which is even farther removed from God and also lacks external supernatural assistance. If one uses the phrase, *ex puris naturalibus* in this second sense to refer to a situation in which both kinds of assistance are lacking, then one must agree with Gregory and say that man by nature cannot avoid sin. However, when the first meaning is used, Ockham is right for a man can do what is morally good *ex puris naturalibus* as long as he has some sort of supernatural aid, even if this be only external.[18]

[16] I Sent., q. 9, a. 2, 139 G.

[17] M. Patronnier de Gandillac, op. cit., 52, fn. 1.

[18] I Sent., q. 9, a. 2, 142 C. "Vitare peccatum ex puris naturalibus potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo ut per pura naturalia excludamus omnia dona infusa supernaturalia. Alio modo ut per hoc excludamus adjutorium supernaturale. Tunc secundum hoc pono aliquas propositiones: Prima quod secundo modo nullus ex puris naturalibus potest aliquod peccatum vitare. Patet: quia esto quod Deus absolveret ipsum a debito habendi caritatem seu quodvis alium donum supernaturale tamen adhuc non potest ex suis puris naturalibus (idest ex se et sine adjutorio Dei supernaturali) peccata vitare sicut nec aliquid agere bene. Secunda est quod primo modo quis potest ex puris naturalibus quodlibet peccatum vitare. Patet: si Deus absolveret

Now this attempt to mediate between Gregory and Ockham is in actuality purely verbal, for both of these thinkers understood *ex puris naturalibus* in the second of the two senses which have been distinguished.[19] Consequently, Pierre d'Ailly, however reluctant he may be to admit it, in reality agrees with the pessimistic Gregory and has simply invented a new definition which enables him to use Ockham's words but not his meaning. Yet one cannot help but think that he considered this verbal compromise important, for it left preachers and confessors free to employ, as occasion demanded, either the language of moral effort or that of reliance on God's grace.

Turning now to the discussion of predestination, we discover that it is much longer and more complicated than the one we have just outlined, and yet here there is even less genuine disagreement among our three authors, for Ockham and Gregory, as well as Pierre d'Ailly, are all in accord on what we might call the facts of the situation. Given their nominalist presuppositions, they are forced to assert that in the proper and literal sense there is no cause of either reprobation or predestination, so that these are, strictly speaking, wholly unmotivated acts of the divine will. Having said this, however, we must immediately add that they succeed in finding a non-literal way of speaking which enables them to ask why God rejects some and accepts others, and which therefore makes it possible for them to express their opposing Pelagian, Augustinian, and mediating preferences. Nevertheless Pierre d'Ailly is keenly conscious of the fact that he disagrees only on a secondary level of discourse, and so he speaks tentatively, interspersing his comments with phrases like "probably," "it seems" or "I say, but do not assert."

In considering the nominalist view that God's will is unmotivated, we should remember that the theological tradition as repre-

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ipsum a debito habendi donum supernaturale. . . ." It will be observed that the discussion deals with uncorrupted nature, with nature before the fall into sin. Comparable differences between our three authors arise in reference to human nature after the fall, but they are not as clear cut, for Ockham admits that all men are obligated to have the supernatural gift of charity, which is by definition beyond purely natural power, and so his emphasis on human moral strength tends to be disguised.

[19] For Gregory, see text quoted by Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 157, fn. 2; for Ockham, ibid., p. 124.

sented, for instance, by Duns Scotus or Aquinas, had long asserted that human merits or demerits are not real causes of divine decisions, for God is impassible and wholly independent of anything creaturely.[20] However, the nominalists went a step further, for they hold that it is not even right to describe God as self-motivated. Thus one cannot say, as Scotus attempts to do, that the fact that God is an intelligent being implies that his various acts of will and knowledge are related to each other by some sort of rational order. It is wrong to assert that the divine will to save a man is the cause of the act whereby God gives him grace, or, conversely, that something in God, namely God's foreknowledge of sin, is the cause of reprobation. It is wholly inadmissible to talk literally in this way, for God is completely simple, as indeed all orthodox theologians affirmed. To be sure, we inevitably think of God as willing many different things, but actually there is only one single, indivisible act of will in Him and, furthermore, to use Thomistic language, this act of will is identical to the act whereby God knows, and to the act whereby he exists.[21] On the basis of these commonly accepted premises, the nominalists argue that ordinary logic compels us to conclude that there are not even internal causes or reasons for the acts of the divine will, for the supposed causes are in fact indistinguishable from the will.[22]

Now Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas avoided these voluntaristic consequences by refusing to use ordinary logic in reference to God. Scotus employed the logically exceptional concepts of infinity and of the formal distinction, while Aquinas used the no less extraordinary logic of analogy.[23] We shall later mention the reasons which led the nominalists to reject these ways of explain-

[20] E.g., Summa Theologica, I, q. 13, a. 7; and Oxoniensia, op. cit.

[21] Summa Theologica, I, q. 19, a. 2, ad 1; q. 14, a. 4, resp.

[22] I Sent., q. 12, a. 2, 178 G. "Utrum deum velle aliquid alicui possit esse consequens alicuius vere causalis: Et videtur quod non, quia sicut deo nihil potest esse causa ut sit, ita nihil potest ei esse causa ut velit, cum in eo sit omnibus modis idem esse et velle." Ibid., 179 B. "Utrum deum velle aliquid alicui possit esse consequens alicuius vere causalis si antecedens sit deum velle vel scire. . . . Et videtur quod non quia cum in actu divine voluntatis nulla sit omnino distinctio aut prioritas aut posterioritas sicut imaginatur Scotus, non apparet ratio quare ista sit: quia deus velit a ideo deus vult b, plusquam e converso."

[23] For the logically peculiar character of Thomist and Scotist discourse about God, see E. Gilson, Le Thomisme, 5e éd., Paris, 1948, 150–159; and Jean Duns Scot, Paris, 1952, 228–254.

ing how God can have motives for his actions even though he is totally simple; but what needs to be emphasized now is that their own non-literal way of speaking of causes of predestination and reprobation is very different from both the Scotist and the Thomist devices for doing the same thing. It must also be sharply distinguished from theories, such as that of Paul Tillich, which assert that discourse about God is inevitably symbolic. The difference is that even though analogy or symbolism are also non-literal, they are nevertheless held to constitute the best human modes of thinking and talking about God, while the nominalists, in contrast, considered non-literal ways of speaking, although sometimes useful, as distinctly inferior to literal modes of expression. In brief, opponents of the nominalists may agree that it is not literally true that God has motives, but they will not then conclude, as do the nominalists, that it is therefore literally true that God has no motives. Rather they will say that the most accurate statement we can make is that God has motives, but in some analogical or symbolic sense.

Now the non-literal sense of "cause" used by the nominalists was first defined by Ockham when he pointed out there are two different types of ordinary causal propositions, one of which signifies entities which are real causes, whereas the other does not. We say, for instance, that the fact that "there is nothing combustible near the fire" is the cause, the reason, why "the fire does not burn." Obviously the non-proximity of the combustible is not a thing and so, strictly speaking, not a real cause. The causal relation in this instance is between propositions, that is, one is the explanation of why the other is true.[24] Pierre d'Ailly basically agrees with this analysis even though he may have some reservations about Ockham's example, for he uses statements of a somewhat different logical type in order to illustrate "propositional causality." Thus he says that the proposition that "the angles of this plane figure equal 180 degrees" may be called the cause of the judgment, "this is a triangle"; or the cause of a man's ability to laugh might be said to be his rationality; or God's creation of creatures might be called the cause of His Lordship (for other-

[24] Ailly describes Ockham's position op. cit., 176 H. Cf. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 134–135.

wise, of course, there would not be anything of which he is Lord).[25] In none of the cases mentioned can the so-called cause be subsumed under one of Aristotle's four causes and so in the technical, but highly precise terminology of Pierre d'Ailly, the reason why these propositions are causal is simply that they "connote a priority of inference in respect to a conclusion according to our mode of conceiving." [26] Translated into the regrettably crude language which is every-day English, this more or less amounts to saying that the cause in these cases is a fact which to our human way of thinking, and only to our way of thinking, explains another fact. This, then, is the way in which we may speak of causes of predestination and reprobation, and it is on this secondary level of discourse that the nominalists disagree with each other.

Thus Ockham, because of his emphasis on the natural human power to do good deeds, holds that in most cases it is permissible, though not literally true, to say that human merits and demerits are causes of predestination and reprobation. To be sure, there are some exceptions, for it is difficult to think of even an improper sense in which the Virgin Mary, or baptized children dying in infancy, merit election. However, this still leaves open the possibility of speaking of most predestination, as well as all reprobation, as caused.[27] This opinion is opposed by Gregory of Rimini, who because of his conviction that man apart from supernatural aid can do nothing but sin, refused to allow even non-literal reasons for God's decisions.[28] Even he felt it necessary, however, to make an exception to this, for otherwise it would be too easy to think of God as cruel and arbitrary; and so he distinguishes reprobation from punishment, defining reprobation as God's decision to withhold grace. This has no cause, but positive punishment, which always follows reprobation, does have a cause, viz., sin.[29]

As we have already indicated, Pierre d'Ailly wishes to mediate between these extremes by allowing for an improper type of causality for reprobation, but none whatsoever for predestination. In

[25] Ailly, op. cit., 179 F.

[26] Ibid. "Signant causam cognoscendi . . . cum connotatione cuiusdam prioritatis inferentis respectu illati secundum nostrum modum concipiendi."

[27] Ibid., 177 B–C. Cf. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 135–136.

[28] Ibid., 175 A. Cf. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 165–170.

[29] Ibid., 175 H, 176 C. Cf. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 172.

order to do this, he makes a distinction between two different ways in which the human mind naturally, but improperly, orders its thoughts about these matters. There is, first of all, the order supplied by temporal succession, through which we think of what comes first in a time-sequence as the reason, the cause, for what follows; and, secondly, there is an order of means and ends according to which we think of the goal as the cause of the means, or in other words, think of the lesser good as willed on account of, because of, the greater good.[30] In addition to this distinction between two types of order, he differentiates two aspects of predestination. There are, on the one hand, the passive effects of predestination, such as reception of grace and entrance into glory; and, on the other hand, there is God viewed as the active cause of these effects.[31] Because the passive effects unroll in time, it is inevitable and permissible to speak of the earlier as causes of the latter, and so in this way an acceptable meaning may be found for Ockham's statements that grace and merits are the cause of some predestination, while sin is the reason for all reprobation.[32] In this sense also it is possible to speak, as Gregory does, of sin as the cause of punishment.

However, both these men are only partially correct, for they fail to make clear that this sort of improper, temporal causality cannot be applied to active predestination, that is, to God's rôle, for it is wrong to make temporal distinctions in God even when it is recognized that they are not to be taken literally. It is also wrong to in any way suggest that something creaturely, whether human acts or infused supernatural grace, makes God will this or that. Therefore, when speaking of active predestination and reprobation, we should never say, as do Ockham and Gregory, that

[30] See infra, notes 32 and 35.

[31] Ibid., 178 D. "Secundo notandum quod isti termini predestinatio et reprobatio possunt capi dupliciter. Uno modo activi, et sic supponunt pro divino velle . . . . Alio modo passive, et sic supponunt pro effectu voluntatis divine ita quod effectus predestinationis vel reprobationis primo modo dicte potest vocari predestinatio vel reprobatio alio modo."

[32] Ibid., E. "Capiendo predestinationem et reprobationem passive (scilicet pro tali effectu) potest concedi probabiliter quod ipsius esse aliqua causa sumendo causam improprie et large . . . quia de lege ordinata licet non ex natura rei tali merito posito sequit tale premium vel pena. Sic loquendo cuiuslibet reprobationis passive est aliqua causa (scilicet culpa) et alicuius predestinationis est aliqua causa sicut meritum vel gratia."

merits, grace, or sin are the causes of predestination, reprobation or punishment.[33]

This, however, does not wholly exclude causal propositions in reference to active predestination, for it is appropriate to speak of God as self-motivated, that is, as acting with intelligent purpose, ordering means to ends, so that his willing of a greater good is the cause of his willing a lesser. We should not make the mistake of pre-nominalist theologians, such as Duns Scotus, and suppose that this sort of order actually exists in the divine mind, but nevertheless it is permissible to speak of this order in the same fashion as did Duns Scotus.

The crucial principle here is that the lesser good is always willed on account of the greater, for this enables Pierre d'Ailly, as it had Scotus before him,[34] to justify the formulae of single predestination. Because heavenly glory, which is the proper effect and final end of predestination, is the greatest good bestowable on man, it cannot be willed because of anything else such as the lesser goods which are grace and merits. These rather are willed by God as the consequences or effects of his will to confer glory.[35] When this same principle is applied to reprobation and punishment, one reaches opposite conclusions, for punishment, of course, is not something good, and so it cannot be an end freely posited by God. Rather it is itself a means to another end which God has freely and causelessly elected, viz., the maintenance of justice.[36] Thus the cause of reprobation, its *raison d'être*, is the existence of sin which calls for punishment, and so Pierre d'Ailly is able to conclude that the same God who predestines some to salvation freely

[33] Ibid. "Capiendo predestinationem et reprobationem active satis clarum est quod ipsius nulla esse vel esse potest causa." 179 A. "Ideo sequitur quod deum velle punire non possit esse consequens in vera causali ad istud antecedens sortes peccavit vel peccabit. Et iste modum dicendi mihi videtur probabilis, et est tam contra Ockham quam contra Gregorium."

[34] Oxoniensia, op. cit.

[35] Ailly, op. cit., 179 D. "Videret autem iste modus probabilis ex hoc quia ordinate volens finem et eaque sunt ad finem vult media ad finem propter finem. Et ideo licet deus non per prius velit finem quam ea que sunt ad finem quia non est in deo talis prioritas actuum nec talia instantia qualia imaginatur Scotus, etc. Tamen videbitur quod deus velit ea que sunt ad finem propter finem et per consequens minus bonum propter maius bonum. Aliter non esset ordinate volens. Igitur deus vult alicui gratiam et alia que sunt ad beatitudinem propter ipsam beatitudinem que est omnium finis. Et per consequens quia vult alicui gloriam vult ei gratiam."

[36] I.e., justice is simply that which God wills. Ibid., 176 C.

and without cause, reprobates others because of his foreknowledge of their sins.[37]

However, it must be repeated once again that for Pierre d'Ailly these formulae represent only a loose and inaccurate way of speaking, a mere *façon de parler*, and so he is compelled to advance his conclusions cautiously, saying merely that "these are diverse probable ways of speaking . . . nor does it seem easy to choose better." [38] Yet the energy he expends in establishing his single predestinarian way of speaking against Gregory and Ockham makes it clear that he would have liked to be more definite than this, but his nominalist presuppositions compel both him and his opponents to go even beyond what later history knows as double predestination and admit that the reasons for God's decisions are not simply unknown, are not simply mysteries, but are in actual fact nonexistent.

In the light of all this, it does not seem exaggerated to say that Pierre d'Ailly was a nominalist in spite of himself, for his theological preferences were clearly opposed to many of the assertions his nominalism forced him to make. Nominalism proved irresistible to many thinkers even when, as in the case of Pierre d'Ailly, it ran counter to what they would have liked, on other grounds, to say about God and his relationships to man.

II

In view of this situation, it seems that we must seriously ask ourselves what elements of strength in nominalism enabled it to impose itself on the minds of its followers. This is a question which has not generally been raised because, first of all, the logically consistent and utterly dispassionate character of nominalist writings makes it difficult to pierce beneath the surface to the hidden battle of opposing tendencies and, secondly, because most historians have been by training incapable of recognizing the validity and impor-

[37] Ibid., 179 G–H. "Potest hec secundum regula poni quod deum velle aliquid vel intelligere potest esse consequens alicuius propositionis causalis vere." For example, "quia res sunt future ideo deus prescit illas esse futuras, . . . quia sortes est finaliter peccabit ideo deus reprobat sortem (id est non vult sorti dare gloriam finalem) . . . quia sortes finaliter peccabit ideo damnabitur vel deus vult eum punire."

[38] Ibid., 179 D.

tance of the problems which are their chief concern. What I should like to suggest in conclusion is that our own generation, perhaps especially in English speaking countries, is in a better position to develop a sympathetic understanding of both their strengths and weaknesses, for we find ourselves accustomed to posing the same questions as did the nominalists even though our answers are often very different.

As we have already seen, the nominalists were preoccupied with modes of signification, with the different ways in which various types of propositions signify, and so, as we shall now see, they were also concerned with defining the kinds and degrees of evidence.[39] Putting this in modern language, it might be said without excessive distortion that they were interested, first of all, in questions about the logical type, or meaning of sentences and, secondly, in distinguishing the sorts of verification procedures appropriate to different realms of discourse. These questions must be clearly distinguished from the problem of knowledge on the one hand, and the problem of truth on the other. Most scholars have failed to do this, and so have mistakenly represented the nominalists as epistemologically oriented thinkers with strong skeptical tendencies. However, as the result of the recent work of men such as Moody and Boehner,[40] these errors now seem to be almost incredible. To mention just one name, Ockham was so little concerned with the problem of knowledge that he in effect denied its legitimacy, and did not go anywhere near as far as Scotus or Aquinas in trying to explain how knowledge arises. This was because he held that the fact that we know must be simply accepted, for it is, in the Aristotelian sense, a first principle and so can be neither demonstrated nor explained.[41] Nor were the nominalists much interested either in doubting, or in establishing the truth, of single propositions, for this is a very different problem from that of defining the logical type, or character, of the evidence which is appropriate to a given class of statements. An illustration of this is provided by Pierre d'Ailly's attitude toward the evidence for

[39] The best work on these aspects of nominalist thought is by E. A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham, New York, 1935.

[40] See note 4, supra.

[41] Moody, op. cit., 240 ff., 304, 310–311.

the existence of external objects which, he says, and on this point he is more radical than Ockham, is hypothetical or conditional in character. But this is a technical description of a certain type of evidence and does not indicate the slightest trace of skepticism for, as he immediately adds, this type of evidence can be, and in this case is, quite sufficient and it would be irrational, and indeed absurd, to doubt it.[42]

It is probably unnecessary at the present time to argue for the importance and legitimacy of these nominalist emphases, for we now see the same concerns manifesting themselves everywhere: for instance, in the modern Thomist interest in the theory of analogy, and in the endless discussions of the nature and function in theology of existential, symbolic, dramatic, mythological and personalistic modes of expression. All this witnesses to the widespread interest in trying to define the types of meaning and evidence appropriate to different realms of discourse. When looked at in this way, we can more easily appreciate the appeal exercised by nominalism in the late middle ages, for it not only dealt with significant questions but also gave answers which, although preliminary and incomplete, are at least in part still valid.

The fact that these problems are important does not by itself, of course, explain how they came to dominate theological discussion during this period. It is not the purpose of this paper to trace this development, for it is in large part a familiar story. The elaboration of the scholastic method during the two centuries following Abelard brought questions of meaning and evidence increasingly to the fore. Further, the introduction of Greek and Arab learning forced the Christian West to define more and more precisely the ways in which other types of knowledge differ from theology. Thus the questions, and many of the answers, of nominalism are not new; but what is novel is the degree to which it separated questions of meaning and evidence from the problems

[42] I Sent., q. 1, a. 1, 36 F. "Tertio conclusio est quod impossibile viatorem aliquid extrinsecum ab eo sensibile evidenter cognoscere esse evidentia simpliciter et absoluta, sed bene evidentia secundum quid et conditionata." Ibid., 37 A. "Loquendo de evidentia secundum quid seu conditionata . . . quamvis talis apparentia possit esse ipsis obiectis non existentibus per potentiam dei absolutam tamen propter hoc non habemus rationabiliter dubitare. Nam ex hoc multa inconvenientia et absurda sequerentur." Cf. M. Patronnier de Gandillac, op. cit., 68–72; and B. Meller, Studien zur Erkenntnislehre des Peter von Ailly, Freiburg, 1954, 126–135.

of knowledge, truth and being, and then concentrated theological discussion around the former.

We may, for our purposes, distinguish two different aspects of the nominalists' achievement. In the first place, they did a beautiful job of analyzing the different modes of signification and types of evidence which characterize logical propositions on the one hand, and statements referring to ordinary sense experience on the other. Their work in these fields, especially in formal logic, is more and more exciting the admiration of historians, who are finding that many of the proudest discoveries of modern logicians were actually anticipated in the middle ages.[43] The second aspect of the nominalists' achievement is related to the first, for their understanding of the character of logical and ordinary empirical statements enabled them to eliminate certain traditional confusions between these two areas and the domains of metaphysical and theological discourse; and as a consequence they are able to tell us much of abiding value about what metaphysics and theology are not, even though, as many of us would think, their positive understanding of these disciplines was anything but adequate.

This is not the place to expand on this point. All I shall say is that it seems to me that a sympathetic reading of their writings will convince even an anti-nominalist that they did in fact show that a great many arguments in the traditional metaphysics of that time, and perhaps of our own time also, are based on misunderstandings of the meanings of empirical and logical propositions; or, as Ockham would phrase it, these arguments are the result of failing to distinguish between modes of signification and things signified. Thus, to take the most elementary and familiar of examples, he shows with incomparable logical skill that statements such as "Peter has rationality" or "Peter has humanity," can be fully understood, not as asserting that Peter participates in some sort of real universal rationality or humanity, but simply as saying that Peter is one of a class of individuals all of whom may truthfully be said to be "human" or "rational." It is to this task of unmasking the many and subtle attempts to justify meta-

[43] It should be noted that these logical advances were not exclusively the achievement of nominalists. See Ph. Boehner, Medieval Logic, Chicago, 1952; E. A. Moody, Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic, Amsterdam, 1953.

physical doctrines by appeals to linguistic conventions that Ockham devotes the greater part of his genius. But in addition, he and his followers undertake to show that even those propositions of metaphysics and theology which have a proper signification, a genuine meaning, cannot be verified in the same way as empirical and logical assertions. If the Age of Reason had remembered this lesson, Descartes and Spinoza would never have tried to formulate logical-mathematical arguments for the existence of God, nor, at a later date, would the empirical argument of a Paley have ever seen the light of day.

Yet it cannot too often be emphasized that the nominalists were neither anti-metaphysical nor anti-theological. They accepted a modified form of Aristotelian substantialism as well as the objective validity of the principle of causality.[44] Most of them, including Ockham, were convinced that valid arguments for the existence of God could be formulated, even though they were distinctly pessimistic, as are most of us, about how much these proved regarding the divine nature.[45] Far from attacking revealed theology, they defended it against philosophical intrusions and vastly enlarged its area, for it now came to include many assertions about God and ethics which had previously been thought to be at least in part philosophical. Thus, from their own point of view, they were simply exposing fallacies resulting from confusing different types of knowledge and, in view of the unquestionable existence of a great many such confusions, it is not difficult to understand their influence on their contemporaries.

However, this appreciation of the negative or critical part of the nominalist program need not be accompanied by enthusiasm for the remainder of their views. The perspective of the nominalists was, after all, exceedingly limited, for their acuteness was narrowly focused on the two areas of ordinary sense experience and of logic. They show no awareness whatsoever of the distinctive types of meaning and evidence associated with other domains

[44] The fullest reliable account of Ockham's position on these points is that of E. Hochstetter, Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham, Berlin, 1927. It should be noted, however, that Pierre d'Ailly was apparently somewhat more skeptical than his teacher. Meller, op. cit., 110 ff.

[45] Ph. Boehner, "Zu Ockhams Beweis der Existenz Gottes," Franziskanische Studien, XXIII (1950), 50–69.

such as art, ethics, or existential or religious experience, and as a result there are at least two major and comprehensive weaknesses of their whole approach.

The first is perhaps more the concern of the philosopher than of the theologian, for it has to do with the inconclusive character of their refutation, of opposing metaphysical views. The modern metaphysical realist, for example, is in some cases little troubled by their critique, for he has often abandoned linguistically based arguments for universal essences and appeals instead to existential considerations, as Paul Tillich does in connection with his theory of participation; [46] or, in the case of Jacques Maritain, to a special metaphysical insight into the need for a unique kind of explanation quite different from those given in logical or empirical contexts.[47] Medieval nominalism would be helpless before such rebuttals, for it did not become aware of the distinctive character of the areas of meaning and experience from which these rebuttals are drawn. And yet it is hard to be severely critical of it because of this failure, for it takes a long time, as we are discovering, to perceive the full dimensions of the problem of meaning.

However, it is impossible for those interested in the welfare of theology to be equally tolerant of a second weakness, for this one makes the nominalists compare most unfavorably with many of their predecessors. They singularly impoverished the language of metaphysics, and even more of theology. The vivid personalistic and mystical language of St. Bonaventura and the rich ontological and ethical language of St. Thomas were both in large part rejected. With this impoverishment of language came, of course, a reduction of meaningfulness. What we in our day are inclined to call the "existential overtones" of much earlier thought were lost. It should now be clear why this was so, for earlier thinkers had not been as conscious of the problems of meaning and evidence, and so they were far more willing to draw on all the realms of discourse and of meaning for the expression of their thought. They employed symbol, allegory and analogy, not wholly uncritically by any means, yet with far less concern than the nominalists about

[46] Systematic Theology, vol. I, Chicago (1951), 176–178.

[47] "Science, Philosophy and Faith," Science, Philosophy and Religion: A Symposium, New York, 1941, 162–183.

exactly how and what such language signifies. The nominalists could not do this, not because they insisted on defining the meaning and evidence of their assertions, but because their notions of meaning and evidence were drawn from investigations of empirical and logical propositions. Pressed into this strait-jacket, they were forced, as we saw earlier, to think of much of theology, not as expressing truth about divine realities, but simply as dealing with permissible, though secondary and inaccurate, ways of speaking. Further, the evidence for theological affirmations was wholly detached from existential and moral experience, with the result that their acceptance depends wholly on what was conceived of as the purely external authority of Scripture, tradition, the church, and, to a minor extent, considerations of practical and devotional expediency. Thus it is no exaggeration to say that the limited character of the important and valuable contributions made by the nominalists produced an unprecedented theological catastrophe.

In saying this, we have concluded with a completely conventional verdict, so it is perhaps wise to repeat that our reasons for arriving at this verdict are not the usual ones. It is customary to describe the nominalists as primarily interested in promoting fideism and theological positivism, an exaggerated individualism, and a doctrine of God as arbitrary power. On this basis it is impossible to understand their influence in the later middle ages. Why should intelligent men, which the nominalists certainly were, want to advocate blind faith, an impossible isolation of the individual, and an absolutely terrifying view of God? The truth of the matter is that they did not. These views were by-products of an intellectual approach which captivated their minds because of its brilliant and valid successes in limited areas. The by-products themselves rather embarrassed them, as we have seen in connection with one aspect of the thought of Pierre d'Ailly, and they sometimes struggled valiantly to neutralize their more devastating implications.

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